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misled 1 or duplicitous, 2 they should become aware of and disclose the
real reasons for their decisions.
I propose we reconsider this consensus position. Perhaps judges
should be candid but not introspective. By candid, I mean never being
consciously duplicitous. Candid opinions do not offer reasons judges
know do not persuade them. 3 By introspective, I mean critically examining one's mental states to avoid any self-deception or error.4 Behavior is nonintrospective if it cannot be done by someone who is
aware of its nature. In this article, I consider whether judges ought to
decide candidly but nonintrospectively. 5
Demands for introspection were prevalent among the legal realists,
who complained that judges did not understand their own decisions. 6
The realists urged judges to recognize and to disclose the motivations
1. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Binder, On Critical Legal
Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 16 GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (1987); Posner, The Jurisprudence ofSkepticism,
86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 865 (1988); Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's
Decision-Making. 39 MERCER L. REv. 937 (1988); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
HARV. L. REV. 537, 579-92 (1982).
2. See Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 721 (1979); D. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor. 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). But see M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME CoURT 27 (1964) (admitting that while judicial candor might be best in
theory, courts are political agencies and "politics is the art of the possible here and now.");
Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process. 35 STAN. L. REV.
213, 249-57 (1983) (arguing that calls for candor in the judicial process ignore the mitigating
effects of legal fictions on judicial incompetence and bad faith); Zeppos, Judicial Candor and
Statutory Interpretation, 18 GEO. L.J. 353, 411-12 (1989) (arguing that calls for judicial candor
are premature until the judicial decisionmaking process is better understood).
3. I ignore the question of failure to disclose fully all of the reasons that persuade.
4. Although I adopt the word "introspection" for convenience, I do not mean to adopt its
psychologically or philosophicclly controversial associations. I do not commit myself to a theory
of knowledge or truth that requires a single truth about one's mental states. I also do not assume
that we in fact gain knowledge about our mental function from some special process of internal
viewing, rather than from making inferences from our own behavior. See Nisbett & Wilson,
Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Process, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV.
·231 (1977). There are strong reasons for thinking that perfect access to our own mental states is
not possible. By introspection, I mean only attempting (by whatever process we in fact use) to
examine our mental states in a critical way in order to improve our beliefs about them.
5. This article does not join issue directly with David Shapiro, who defends judicial candor
against five reasons for judges to lie - continuity, collegiality, fear of the effects of knowledge,
tragic choices, and moral duties. I do not consider whether judges ought to lie. See D. Shapiro,
supra note 2. I focus on whether judges should introspect. Shapiro avoids this topic: "A judge
•.. fulfills any requirement of candor when he believes what he is saying .••." Id. at 734. "I do
not mean to include self-deception within the scope of this inquiry." Id. at 732:
6. Thurman Arnold saw legal discourse as a tool for denial and rationalization:
[W]e must consider institutions ... as living organisms, not dissimilar to human personalities, molded by habit, shaken by emotional conflicts, turned this way and that by words,
constantly making good resolutions which affect them but not in the way that the terminology of the resolutions might indicate, and never quite understanding themselves ..• because

of the necessary illusions with which they must surround themselves to preserve their prestige
and self-respect.
T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GoVERNMENT 25-26 (1935) (emphasis added); see also id. at 3338.
Jerome Frank found the myth of certainty attributable to a child's need for control over the
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that the judges deny, and rationalize by appeal to doctrine. 7
Some Critical Legal Studies (CLS) critics attempt to induce introspection. 8 By demonstrating that judges are either mistaken or lying
about their decision process, critics would compel judges to abandon
current practices as dishonest and harmful. 9 These modem critics demand introspection both because they think that a legal system in
which some participants misunderstand their roles cannot be justified,
and because they believe that false judicial beliefs lead to less desirable
decisions.
I have reservations about attempts to induce judges to develop perfectly accurate views of their tasks. Although I think judges are not so
misled as CLS writers allege, it seems to me possible that judges hold
inaccurate beliefs about their jobs, and that a legal system including
such beliefs could be justified.
In Part I, I consider whether judges might hold inaccurate beliefs
that make them more candid and constrained. I suggest that even if
theories of neutral decisionmak.ing are incomplete and inaccurate, a
legal system in which judges hold these beliefs about their own behavior could have advantages. If many judges believe that they can,
should, and do decide almost all cases by following the law, they
might behave differently than they would if they held more accurate
world, which after infancy is displaced by belief in a father's omnipotence, and which still later is
filled by beliefin the certainty of the law. See J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 141-42.
Max Radin held a similar, though less psychological view. See Radin, The Theory ofJudicial
Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 360 (1925) ("Practical as we profess to be, we
have buttered our parsnips with fine words so much, it is sometimes hard to find the succulent
vegetable under the oleomargarine.").
7. Arnold saw that these mechanisms could not work once people recognized them as such:
[T]he philosophy which is here represented is not, and cannot be, a philosophy which will
work pragmatically for intellectuals.••• Folklore which is frankly recognized by a people to
be folklore is from that moment no longer folklore. Its magic is gone, and a new folklore,
which is not so recognized, must arise.
T. ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 237. Arnold dismissed these functions as inappropriate, and seemed
to yearn for introspection. See id. at 229; cf. J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 157 ("[A]lthough fear of
legal uncertainty leads to this concealment, ••• [t]he concealment has merely made the labor of
judges less effective."); Radin, supra note 6, at 360 ("I want them taken for what they are, for the
poetry of the law chanted to fill our hearts with the proper juristic ardor before the battle begins;
but we should see to it that the bards and poets are carefully led to the side-lines when the
conflict is on.").
8. American CLS scholars often seem to adopt a version of immanent (or internal) critique
from the Frankfurt school theorists. The traditional notion was simple: demonstrate that people's conception of something does not conform to that thing in the world, in hopes that the
people will then abandon or modify their conception once confronted with the conflict. See
Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 332-38 (1987). Recent followers of
the Frankfurt school have been careful to point out that this tactic will only work in special
circumstances. See, e.g., R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRmCAL THEORY 76 (1981) (critical theory
will only work if actors adopt it as their "self-consciousness.").
9. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1
(1984).
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beliefs. They might behave so as to facilitate repression and denial,
because their self-esteem depends on maintaining the belief that they
decide as they think they ought to decide. I suggest that such psychological mechanisms preserve candor and help law to constrain
decisions.
In Part II, I assume that inaccurate beliefs preserve candor and
help law constrain, and I inquire whether we should prefer such a
system to one with completely introspective judges. I suggest that encouraging judges to understand their decision process better, if effective at all, could be harmful, would probably not succeed, and even if
successful might not be worth doing.
·
I do not pretend that nonintrospection is ideal. I see it· as the least
bad option available, if somewhat fuaccurate internalized beliefs preserve constraint and candor. In Part III, I discuss the dilemma facing
legal teachers and scholars if inducing people to hold true beliefs has
bad consequences.
In sum, I niake four pointS in this article. Descriptively, i remind
legal theorists that judges decide in complicated ways that might be
illuminated by psychological accounts of denial and rationalization, or
cognitive dissonance, and that might include holding and sustaining
inaccurate beliefs. Normatively, I argue that judges holding inaccurate beliefs about their decisions might decide better than they would
with a clearer understanding of their actions. Philosophically, I suggest that if a system including judges who hold inaccurate beliefs has
sufficient benefits, we should consider carefully whether such a system
could in principle be justified. Editorially, I point out that by failing to
consider the benefits of false beliefs, and the difficulty and harm of
trying to destroy them, critical scholars have advocated imprudent
tactics given their stated political goals.

I. Is THE BELIEF IN LAW PARTIALLY SELF-FULFILLING?
In this Part, I argue that law might constrain more, and judges
might be more candid, if judges and others believe slightly inaccurate
or oversimplified accounts of decisionmaking. I also explain how and
why judges might maintain such beliefs.

A.

Transparent Justification

Before making these arguments, I should explain a philosophical
difficulty with the project. Even if I can identify benefits to judges
holding inaccurate views, and show that attempts to induce judges to
hold more accurate views would make the world worse, some philoso-
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phers would conclude that I did not justify a method of deciding cases.
Although my argument might be persuasive, it is not transparent, and
is therefore unacceptable to them.
A reason or justification is nontransparent if, when people whose
behavior it concerns accept it, they become less able to act in the way
that the reason justifies. 10 By contrast, a transparent reason or justification will not induce people whose behavior it justifies, if they come
to accept it, to act less justifiably in the justification's own terms. 11
The following story illustrates this distinction:
Anne was lost in the woods, and crying for her parents. "Stay here,'' I
told her, as I set off to find them. I soon discovered another child
(dressed just like Anne) screaming in pain. A tree had fallen on her legs.
I couldn't lift the tree. So I went to look for help.
A man and woman appeared, and I motioned for them to follow me
to the fallen tree. They stopped, hurriedly told me about their daughter
Anne, and asked me why they should follow.
Two responses came to mind: first, a child is hurt and needs help;
second, their daughter is safe and nearby, so they need not ignore the
first reason as less important than their own concerns. But before I
could offer these reasons, I remembered the huge tree, and realized that
it was too large even for three to lift. I despaired of finding any reason
for them to follow.
Suddenly an idea came to me. I had read that parents afraid for their
children's welfare sometimes perform otherwise impossible acts of
strength. Perhaps we could help the child if the couple mistakenly believed that Anne was beneath the tree. So I decided that the couple
should help me for a third reason: they could save a suffering child using
the strength brought on by their false belief that the child under the tree
was Anne. Of course, I could not tell them the third reason, because
informing them that their false belief made them useful would have deprived them of the very strength that enabled them to help.

The third reason in this story is nontransparent because convincing
10. I do not enter the debate on the philosophical question "what is a justification?" Some
writers contend that the purpose of justification is to convince. If a reason is nontransparent, it
cannot justify. See, e.g., J. EI.STER, SOUR GRAPES 91 (1983). Derek Parfit takes the opposite
position:
It is not the aim of a theory to be believed[,] •.. but to be true, or to be the best theory••••
. . . If the best theory was [nontransparent], telling us to believe some other theory, the
truth about rationality would be depressingly convoluted. It is natural to hope that the
truth is simpler: that the best theory would tell us to believe itself. But can this be more
than a hope? Can we assume that the truth must be simpler? We cannot.
D. PARFIT, REAsONS AND PERSONS 24 (1984) (emphasis in original). Without offering new
arguments, I adopt Parfit's position in this article.
11. This use of the term "transparency" follows Bernard Williams. See B. WILLIAMS, E1111cs AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 101-10 (1985) (explaining why some forms of utilitarianism are not transparent, and identifying both Sidgwick and Hare as "Government House
Utilitarians" who support nontransparent theories).
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the couple to use the strength brought on by their mistake would have
incapacitated them from helping.
Some philosophers believe that any legitimate justification must be
transparent. 12 Most legal philosophers agree. Justifications of judging
have always presumed that judges can and should believe the
justification. 13
In this article, I explore a contrary view. 14 Only a nontransparent
12. S. BOK, LYING 97-98 (1978); J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND
AGAINST 123, 139 (1973); B. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 101-02; Devine, The Conscious Acceptance of Guilt in the Necessary Murder, 89 ETHICS 221, 223-24 (1979); see J. ELSTER, supra note
10, at 91-100 (noting that for some political institutions, their main benefits, as seen ex post, are
by-products that cannot be achieved if they are consciously aimed at by the members of a society,
and citing Tocqueville's Democracy in America as an attempt to evaluate institutions in this way).
Elster seems, however, to reject such benefits as possible justifications because "constitutionmakers ••• cannot coherently invoke them in public." Id. at 92. Elster elsewhere call this
"excess of will." See J. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS 18-20 (1989). Rawls and Bister attribute insistence on transparency to Kant. See J. ELSTER, supra note 10, at 92; J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 & n.8 (1971). Transparency is not valued only by liberals, but by many
radicals as well. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 101; see, e.g., R. GEUSS, supra note 8, at 63-75.
Rawls' publicity requirement includes transparency. Public justification must in fact be
known or knowable by all members of a just society. See J. RAWLS, supra, at 133 ("They suppose that everyone will know about these principles all that he would know if their acceptance
were the result of an agreement."); id. at 581.
13. The closest legal theorists have come to endorsing judicial delusion was the early writing
on legal fictions. See, e.g., H. vAHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF" (C. Ogden trans. 1924).
Vahinger notes that many disciplines, including law, rely on fictions - or acting "as if" something known to be false were true. He saw that it is a nearly universal human tendency, in order
to acquire the benefit of those fictions with a minimum of psychological stress, actually to come
to believe them. This process Vahinger called an ideational shift from fiction to dogma. Id. at
124-34. Despite noticing the importance of fictions, and noticing that they are very difficult to
use without coming to believe them, Vahinger maintained that accepting the fictions as true was
a weakness that would eventually be overcome. Id. at 132, Therefore, despite identifying many
benefits of what I call nontransparency, Vahinger never came to accept it as a justification. See
Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290 (1981) (discussing Bentham's, Vahinger's,
and Fuller's accounts of legal fictions).
Fuller attributes to Vahinger a strong admiration for the benefits of mistaken thought. See L.
FuLLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 118 (1967) ("Vahinger likens thought to the process of walking.
Walking consists in a series of falls, each arresting and compensating the other just in time. So
thinking consists in a series of mutually opposed mistakes.").
Martin Shapiro has suggested that even if the Supreme Court is engaged in discretionary
political activity, it should not necessarily say so in public: "It would be fantastic indeed if the
Supreme Court, in the name of sound scholarship, were to disavow publicly the myth upon
which its power rests." M. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 27. Because Shapiro does not make clear
whether he wants the Court to lie, or not to become aware of its own manipulation, I cannot say
whether he supports a nontransparent theory, or one that is truly nonpublic. See infra note 16.
14. Some support for nontransparent justification appears in legal and philosophical literature. See D. PARFIT, supra note 10, at 3-49 (Acknowledging that transparency is desirable, but
that the best theories of morality and rationality might be such that their goals will be best
achieved if people aim at something besides the goals dictated by the theory. When this is true,
he calls a theory "indirectly self-defeating."); Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:
On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984) (suggesting acoustic
separation between how the criminal laws operate, and how most people believe they operate); G.
CALABRESI & P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 20-28, 50, 78-79, 134 (1978); G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW (1985); H. SlDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 413
(1962); J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 50-53; Alexander, Pursuing the good Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985); Harrison & Mashburn, Jean-Luc Godard and Critical Legal
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justification can ·support the position that judges should hold inaccurate beliefs about their roles. My justification approves behavior such
as denial, which, like strength induced by error, works best if the individual can avoid noticing that she is doing it. 15 Judges might be dis. abled by complete understanding of their acts, in much the way
Anne's parents would have been.
By considering whether judges should hold inaccurate beliefs, I do
not suggest that we should abandon a requirement related to transparency that is sometimes called publicity: justifications must be acceptable to any rational individual as a reason for action. 16 The
justification I offer is public in this sense. It could be offered to and
accepted by any rational individual, including a judge. Nontransparent justifications must not be offered in some circumstances because
they might be accepted and therefore self-defeat.
I do not support anything like Plato's noble lie.17 Plato advocated
leading people to have false views of their origin to justify class distinctions. His lie was not public in the sense that it would not be acceptable to those deceived. Further, I do not advocate actively trying to
deceive judges. I suggest only that we should not try to induce them
to introspect.
I also do not argue that judges should avoid self-conscious decisionmaking. Self-consciousness means having and trying to use a theory about the nature of one's actions. Nonself-conscious judging
would demand that judges simply decide cases without holding any
view about how they should decide. Indeed, some critics do seem to
believe that judges need no theory of decisionmaking, either because
theory is unrelated to practice, or because judicial decisionmaking is
Studies (Because We Need the Eggs), 87 MICH. L. REV. 1924 (1989); Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands ofMorality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134 (1984); Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, 11 CALIF. L. REV. 561, 566 n.15 (1989) (quoting A. SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO TIIE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TIIE WEALTII OF NATIONS 456 (R, Campbell &
A. Skinner eds. 1976)) ("By pursuing his own interest [the individual] frequently promotes that
of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it."); Weyrauch, Law as
Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 699 (1979); cf. D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY
CoNCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 118 (Open Court Publishing Co. ed. 1953) (1777)
(The "truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of
society; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must
confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious.••• Why dig up the pestilence from the pit
in which it is buried?").
15. See supra note 7.
16. See. e.g., S. BoK, supra note 12, at 105-06. Nietzsche is often cited as among the only
thinkers to reject even this minimal requirement for publicity, because he suggested that some
people need not be offered justifications. See Gaus, Subjective Value and Justificatory Political
Theory, in JUSTIFICATION: NoMos XXVIII 241, 255-58 (1986). Rawls' notion of publicity includes both publicity in Bok's terms and transparency as I am using the term. See J. RAWLS,
supra note 12, at 133.
17. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC *414b.
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nothing but an exercise in power that could not be affected by theories
held by judges.18
·
I hold the opposite view. Judges should be self-conscious. They
do and ought to have views about their roles as judges. These theories
affect their decisions. Opposing introspection means only that these
role conceptions need not always be consistent with a perfectly accurate view of a judge's own mental process. .

B. · Partially Self-Fulfilling Beliefs
Some critics contend that law constrains judges little or not at all.
Rules already announced limit a judge's decision no more than if the
relevant rule were "do as you like." 19 This position presupposes the
radical indeterminacy of both rules and higher order legal values.
Rather than rehearse all the arguments against indeterminacy,20 I
argue here that certain judicial failures to introspect might help make
law more constraining, because the belief in law is partially self-fulfilling. 21 By "partially self-fulfilling," I mean something that is false, but
that becomes closer to being true because people believe it.22
I argue that law becomes more or less constraining depending on
individual judges' beliefs about law, judges' role conceptions, and ex18. See, e.g., s. FlsH, DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY 465 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he
removal of critical self-consciousness from the list of possible ways of acting does not deprive
anyone of anything").
·
19. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique ofInterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 819 n.119 (1983).
·
20. See, e.g., Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 11 CALIP. L. REv. 283 (1989); Schauer, Easy
Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
21. For accounts of self-fulfilling beliefs, see S. BRAMS, PARADOXES IN PoLmcs 53-77
(1976); SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIORS (R. Curtis ed. 1989); J. ELSTER,. ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 106 (1984); R. JONES, SELP-Ful.PILLING PROPHECIES (1977); R... MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 421-36 (1957); R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN
THE CLAssROOM (1968); Berger, Connor & McKeown, Evaluations and the Formation and
Maintenance of Performance Expectations, in EXPECTATION STATES THEORY 27 (J. Berger, T.
Connor & M. Pisek eds. 1974); Krishna, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" and the Nature ofSociety, 36 AM. Soc. REv. 1104 (1971); Watzlawick, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, in THE 'INvENTEo
REALITY 95 (P. Watzlawick ed. 1984).
In response to realist attacks on determinacy, some writers have suggested that these attacks
could be self-fulfilling. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 84 (1962); F.
HAYEK, THE CoNSTITUTION OP LIBERTY 206 (1960) ("If the ideal of the rule of law is a firm
element of public opinion, legislation and jurisdiction will tend to approach it more and more
closely. But if it is represented as an impracticable and even undesirable ideal and people cease
to strive for its realization, it will rapidly disappear.").
22. Some people have suggested that individual beliefs about the likelihood of a marriage
surviving are partially self-fulfilling. See, e.g., G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 224-25
(1981); cf. J. ELSTER, supra note 10, at 7. I expect that there are some ~tates of the world that
can only, or at least most easily, be brought about by many people believing that the world is
something like, but not exactly like, it is. If so, then partially self-fulfilling beliefs might be
(nontransparently) justified as needed to bring about such states of affairs •.
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pectations about Jaw held by observers in various positions of power. I
find that judges who believe law can and should constrain are more
constrained by law than judges who do not think law should constrain,
though less than the first group believes they are constrained. Belief in
law is thus somewhat self-fulfilling. Nonintrospection might make law
more effective, because the judicial beliefs and role conceptions that
permit law to constrain most effectively are not completely accurate. 23
I suggest that judges follow rules and implement principles in part
because they believe that they can and should do so, that they might
overestimate the frequency with which this is possible, that this overestimation increases the chance that law constrains judges, and that a
clearer understanding could decrease constraint and candor. First,
however, I explain why judges might hold such false beliefs, how they
sustain them, and why these beliefs affect behavior.
1.

The Psychology of Self-Fulfilling Beliefs

People sometimes fail to notice that their desires and behavior do
not match their ideals. Psychoanalysts call the mental mechanisms
that permit this defenses. 24 Cognitive theorists talk of dissonance reduction.25 Despite important disagreements among members of these
schools, they agree that people tend to find strategies to avoid examin23. There is currently a debate as to whether public choice interpretations of legislation
should be stated in public. This debate mirrors the question I address in this paper. See, e.g.,
Brennan & Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case/or the "Nobel" Lie, 14 VA. L. REV.
179, 185-86 (1988) ("As scientists, we consider it our purpose to destroy myths. But we should
recognize that the 'myths of democracy' may be essential to ••• stable political order."); Kelman,
"Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 PUB. INTERESI' 80, 93-94 (1987) ("Cynical descriptive
conclusions about behavior in government threaten to undermine the norm prescribing public
spirit. The cynicism of journalists - and even the writings of professors - can decrease public
spirit simply by describing what they claim to be its absence. Cynics are therefore in the business
of making prophesies that threaten to become self-fulfilling • • • • That is the tragedy of public
choice."); Mashaw, The Economies of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 Cm.KENT L. REV. 123 (1989).
24. See, e.g., A. FREUD, THE EGo AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1966); J, SANDLER
& A. FREUD, THE ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE: THE EGo AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE
REVISITED (1985); N. HAAN, CoPING AND DEFENDING: PROCESSES OF SELF-ENVIRONMENT
ORGANIZATION (1977). Many scholars have suggested that judging can be understood in psychoanalytic terms. See, e.g.• A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1971); J.
FRANK, supra note 1; A. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHI·
ATRY AND LAW (1967); H. LASWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 65-88 (1948) (psychoanalyzing three judges); c. SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE LAW (1973); A. WATSON,
PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 129, 133, 187 (1968); Ormrod, Judges and the Processes ofJudging,
in JUBILEE LECTURES CELEBRATING THE FOUNDATION OF THE FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVER·
SITY OF BIRMINGHAM 181 (1981); Schroeder, The Psychoanalytic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6
CALIF. L. REV. 89 (1918); Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's Decision
Making, 39 MERCER L. REv. 937 (1988); Winick, Gerver & Blumberg, The Psychology of
Judges, in LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 121, 136-38 (H. Toch ed. 1961).
25. See, e.g.• L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNmVE DISSONANCE (1957); R. WICKLUND
& J. BREHM, PERSPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1976).
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ing internal conflicts and unpleasant facts. By invoking these theories,
I do not mean to suggest that all or even much of judicial behavior is
best understood in these terms. I suggest only that ego defense, dissonance reduction, or some other means of avoiding conflicts plays a role
in legal decisionmaking. 26
Psychoanalytic theory supposes that people defend against unpleasurable affect caused by internal conflict.27 Some recent theory
suggests that defenses are used to reduce conflict, whatever its source,
including defending against superego demands and prohibitions.28
Accordingly, judges might fail to notice aspects of their jobs as a
means of reducing guilt or shame when they do not meet moral demands they place on themselves. In psychoanalytic terms, two ways
of not noticing - denial and repression - and three tactics for facilitating this failure to notice - rationalization, projection, and splitting
- could help explain how and why judges avoid introspection.29
26. On the importance of avoiding explanations of judicial behavior that rely on few variables, and the need for more complex theories, see Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The
Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, S POL. BEHAv. 7 (1983).
27. See, e.g., C. BRENNER, THE MIND JN CoNFLicr 72 (1982). Traditionally, psychoanalysts thought that people defended only against conflict caused by unacceptable drive derivatives.
See A. FREUD, supra note 24, at S8.
28. C. BRENNER, supra note 27, at SS, 7S; Wallerstein, Defenses, Defense Mechanisms, and
the Structure of the Mind, in DEFENSE AND REsISTANCE 201, 223 (H. Blum ed. 198S).
29. See C. BRENNER, supra note 27, at 120. Denial means "distortion of one's perception of
.•• external reality." Id. at 77. Judges might fail to become aware of some aspects of their
decisionmaking process, such as the extent to which they manipulate precedents and facts. Denial often refers only to gross distortions of perception. See L. SCHILLING, PERSPECTIVES ON
CoUNSELING THEORIES 31 (1984). I have in mind, however, a more subtle failure to notice
one's own process of decision. See Willick, On the Concept of Primitive Defenses, in DEFENSE
AND REsISTANCE, supra note 28, at 17S, 194.
Repression is failing to become aware of one's own motivations or impulses. See G. SWAN·
SON, EGo DEFENSES AND TIIE LEGmMATION OF BEHAVIOR 116 (1988). Judges might repress
to avoid noticing that they are sometimes motivated by moral and political views of their own, or
by prejudices and sympathies, that they believe should not motivate them.
Rationalization entails offering a faulty, but somewhat plausible, account of why one is not
motivated by an illicit drive, or engaged in an unacceptable activity, to avoid noticing that one is
indeed doing the prohibited thing. See id. at 108. Some of the discussion in judicial opinions can
be understood as rationalization. See J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 134-37; C. SCHOENFELD, supra
note 24, at 77-79; Schroeder, supra note 24, at 93-9S; Watson, supra note 24, at 948.
Projection is "[a] process by which an objectionable, internal tendency is unrealistically attributed to another person or persons ... instead of being recognized as a part of one's self." G.
SWANSON, supra, at lOS. Some opinions attribute difficult decisions to the legislature, or to
precedent, when it is clear that the judge had power to decide either way. This process can be
understood as an attempt to avoid feeling responsible by attributing the decision to someone or
something else. See C. SCHOENFELD, supra note 24, at 82; Watson, supra note 24, at 9S7; cf R.
CoVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 236-38 (197S) (discussing the false attribution of power to other authorities as a way some judges have decreased dissonance).
Splitting means stark separation of people and things into good and evil. See, e.g., M. KLEIN,
ENVY AND GRATITUDE AND OrHER WORKS 1946-1963, at 1-24 (M. Khan ed. 197S). Although
psychiatrists usually refer to splitting as a primitive defense typical of people with borderline
personality disorders, there seems to be a common and much less dramatic defense in which
people avoid noticing moral complexity that threatens their own simple moral views. Instead
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I suggest that judges .use these tactics to avoid internal conflicts,
and to avoid noticing disturbing facts about themselves and about the
world. 30 Taking responsibility for difficult and important decisions
and acknowledging moral complexity is often unpleasant.
My argument that belief in following law is somewhat self-fulfilling
can invoke theories of defense. Ego defenses affect more than mental
processes; they alter behavior.31 If superego demands and other conflicts lead judges to defend, such conflicts might also lead judges to
decide differently. 32 Judges accept an obligation to follow law. If they
cannot always do so, defenses might permit them not to notice some of
their failures to meet their ego ideal. Judges using these defenses
might be more constrained by law than judges who are more conscious
of failures to meet their ego ideal. Although an introspective judge
might more flexibly choose when to follow law, I argue that problems
such as weakness of will and other cognitive difficulties might lead an
introspective judge to ignore law more often and in less desirable
circumstances.
A parallel argument can be made using the language of cognitive
dissonance. 33 The standard account of cognitive dissonance is that noticing how two cognitions conflict makes us uncomfortable. 34 Some
recent interpretations focus on dissonance caused by conflicting impressions of the self, including noticing that one's behavior does not
match one's self-image. 35 If the gap between a person's perceptions of
they simplify the situation to one obviously right position and one obviously wrong position. See
generally D. LEVINE, THE FLIGHT FROM AMBIGUITY 12-13, 33 (1985); J. LoEVINGER & R.
WESSLER, MEAsURING EGo DEVELOPMENT (Jessey-Bass Behavioral Science Series 1, 1970).
Legal doctrine, especially when it takes the form of rules, might facilitate a mild form of splitting.
Consider how many times you have read a decision in which each of the applicable factors miraculously counsels ruling in favor of the winning party, or in which the judge need not select
among competing rules, because the same party wins under all possible rules. Most judicial
opinions are written as if the outcome were obvious, never permitting doubt or moral difficulty to
appear. These rhetorical devices reinforce the tendency to avoid moral complexity. Applying
rules requires reduction of complex situations into clear decisions. Some judges go far beyond
the necessary simplifications when they apply rules.
30. See M. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A Jusr WORLD 20-21 (1980).
31. See, e.g., Wallerstein, supra note 28, at 205-08.
32. See, e.g., C. BRENNER, supra note 27, at 216-21 (connecting defense against superego
demands with charitable behavior).
33. Robert Cover offers a cognitive dissonance theory of the behavior of some judges who
decided fugitive slave cases. See R. CoVER, supra note 29, at 226-38.
34. L. FE.sTINGER, supra note 25, at 3; see also R. WICKLUND & J. BREHM, supra note 25.
For recent literature reviews, see Cialdidi, Petty & Cacioppo, Attitudes and Attitude Change, 32
ANN. REv. PSYCHOLOGY 357 (1981); Cooper & Croyle, Attitudes and Attitude Change, 35 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOLOGY 395 (1984).
35. In this respect, some modern dissonance theory is becoming more like ego-defense theory. See, e.g., Greenwald & Ronis, Twenty Years of Cognitive Dissonance: Case Study of the
Evolution of a Theory, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL REv. 53, 55 (1978); Steele & Lui, Dissonance
Processes as Self-Affirmation, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1983).
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her behavior and her ideals is large enough, creating sufficient discomfort, she will be motivated to reduce the discomfort using any of a
number of tactics, three of which seem to me especially relevant:
changing one's behavior to meet the ideal; 36 changing one's perceptions of the behavior so that it seems to meet the ideal; 37 and altering
the ideal so that one's behavior now conforms to it. 38
Introspection might make judges uncomfortable. Cognitive dissonance theory explains why judges might mistakenly believe they succeed more often than they do: they have altered their perceptions of
their activities to reduce the discomfort of failing to meet their ideals.
The theory also explains why judges might be more constrained if they
believe in the possibility and desirability of constraint: ignoring law
too often or too blatantly would create discomfort. So they may alter
their behavior to conform more closely to their ideals. Finally, dissonance theory explains why revealing the extent to which judges fail at
their goals seems risky: if modifying their behavior or their perceptions of their behavior is difficult, they might alter their ideals to something more regularly possible, but less desirable.
2.

Whether Constraint Varies with Beliefs

In this section, I explain how judges' different beliefs might affect
the extent to which law constrains them. 39 By constrained, I do not
mean compelled to reach a particular outcome; rather, I mean only
prevented from reaching some outcome that a judge prefers. Judges
could never be entirely unconstrained. All judges are limited in what
they can do by many forces, only one of which is law. Judges must
build consensus on collegial courts, avoid being reversed, escape undue
social pressure from the public, and perform a wide variety of other
tasks that limit their decisions. Further, law to some extent constrains
judges no matter what they believe. The question I discuss is whether
marginal changes in law's constraint depend on individual judges'
beliefs.
To see how law constrains judges regardless of the beliefs they
36. R. WICKLUND & J. BREHM, supra note 25, at 132-34.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id.
39. Anthony D'Amato has suggested that what legal theories judges believe can affect how
constrained the judges are. See D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of
Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 564 (1989); see also R. KEETON, JUDGING 13 (1990) ("The professional commitment of the judge - what the judge believes about what he or she is doing makes a difference. If any judge believes with the cynics that reasons for decisions are different
from those publicly stated - as some judges have occasionally proclaimed - the potential contributions of that judge to justice are in some degree limited ••..").
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hold, consider a judge who views his own role as that of political activist: "someone with the 'vocation of social transformation.' " 40
Duncan Kennedy offers such an account. 41 He imagines himself a federal district judge confronting a case that initially presents a conflict
between the law and how he wants to come out.4 Z Kennedy decides to
try justifying the outcome he prefers.43 He finds that law constrains
what he can do: "Law constrains as a physical medium constrains you can't do absolutely anything you want with a pile of bricks, and
what you can do depends on how many you have, as well as on your
other circumstances."44
Kennedy believes law constrains for several reasons, including that
judges view themselves as having promised the public to follow the
law, which they at least must view as an obligation to offer a good
legal argument.45 Sometimes it is simply more difficult to construct
any argument that will seem plausible for ruling in the way you want
that accords with widely held views about how judges should decide
cases. This will depend on the configuration of the field - on how
impacted it is. 46
Kennedy as a judge resembles Houdini. 47 Rules bind like ropes
40. Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 518, 521 (1986); see also Tushnet, The Dilemmas ofLiberal Constitutionalism, 42
Omo ST. LJ. 412, 424-25 (1981). A revised version of Kennedy's article was published as Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOL·
OGY 141 (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds. 1987).
41. See Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, supra
note 40, at 521.
42. By this Kennedy says he means that he initially believes that the rule was clearly intended to govern cases exactly like this one, and that he thinks others will share this impression.
Id. at 518-19.
43. Having to work to achieve an outcome is in my view fundamental to the situation of
the judge.•.• [Y]ou could say that the judge is both free and bound - free to work in any
direction but limited by the pseudo-objectivity of the rule-as-applied, which he may or may
not be able to overcome.
Id. at 522.
44. Id. at 526.
45. Other constraining factors include: judges seek community approval, or at least want to
avoid being accused of having broken that promise; judges do not want to be reversed; judges
want to influence others; judges want to maintain credibility so as to be able to continue their
work in other cases; and judges like to see how their moral views translate into legal terms. Id. at
527-28.
46. By impacted, Kennedy means presenting itself as "highly organized" and presenting an
"image oflegal necessity" in which cases each "refer[] in [their] holding[s] to the other cases and
indicat[e] how the gaps between the cases should be filled." Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, supra note 40, at 153. See also Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, supra note 40, at 538-39. It will also depend on how
smart, and how busy the judge is at the time, how strongly she feels that the apparent application
of the rule is wrong (and therefore how much risk of humiliation she is willing to risk and how
much political capital she is willing to expend) as well as the political climate at the time of the
ruling.
47. A number of judges have adopted "Houdini" as an epithet for other judges who manipu-
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bind. Sometimes the ropes are so tight that a judge cannot escape
them. Sometimes the ropes are such that it depends how skillful the
judge is at trying to escape, and how much time and energy the judge
cares to devote. Sometimes the judge does not care to escape - in
which case she can simply explain that she is bound. The judge is an
escape artist politicized.48
Law constrains Houdini not because he believes that it is a reason
for his decisions. Rather, it constrains him in large part because many
other people whose respect he needs believe that judges can and
should follow rules, and discover values in prior cases, without being
influenced (too much) by their own political views. As a result, Houdini will not always be able to generate arguments that others will
regard as good, or even minimally acceptable, for reaching a particular
result. All judges are constrained by the need to appear to follow
rules, or discover values, as other people understand rule following,
and value discovery.
In the remainder of this section, I argue that law constrains Houdini less than it does other judges because of Houdini's attitude toward
following rules. I must therefore first define "following a rule."4 9 Follate precedent inappropriately. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 222 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[B]y a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes,
and Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language,
'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uniform precedent • • . ."); Pasco Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 567 F.2d 976, 979 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring) (accusing the majority
of escaping from reality "with the wizardry of a Houdini"); First Natl. Bank of Md. v. Burton,
Parsons & Co., 57 Md. App. 437, 450, 470 A.2d 822, 829 (1984) ("Such a task requires more
than a mere factfinder; it requires a Houdini or soothsayer. Courts should confine themselves to
the law, not enter the realm of thaumatology."); Jonaitis v. State, 437 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982) (Staton, J., dissenting) ("The Majority's reference ..• is nothing more than a decoy
to mask the Majority's Houdini-like manipulation of the unambiguous terms of the Juvenile
Code."); State v. Reeves, 427 So. 2d 403, 427 (La. 1982) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting) ("Like a blindfolded Houdini, the majority opinion writer eludes uncontradicted convention history, wiggles
free of plain words in the constitution and discovers a gap in the document no other scholar
knew existed .•..");Pin Pin H. Su v. Kemper Ins. Cos./American Motorists Ins. Co., 431 A.2d
416, 420 (R.I. 1981) (Kelleher, J., dissenting) ("Houdini would certainly appreciate such 'sleight
of eye.' •• .'').
48. My discussion of Houdini caricatures Kennedy's position. Kennedy notes that how he
wants to come out may change once he starts reading cases, not just because the cases prove hard
to manipulate, but also because the cases convince him. See Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, supra note 40, at 157-61. I agree with Kennedy that even the most
manipulative judge will be subject to such conversion, and indeed that judges' initial impressions
of how they want to decide are already influenced by having read cases on the subject. Id. at 157.
I ignore this important factor in describing Houdini, because if Houdini, who did not allow
himself to be convinced by the normative power of the field is constrained, a fortiori, so will any
real judge be constrained. As well, I do not consider being convinced that one's initial preference
was wrong as being constrained by law.
49. I do not commit myself to any notion of the literal meaning of rules apart from acts of
interpretation. Rather, I only claim that if at a moment, in a particular context, judges anticipate
that most people (or most people whose opinions matter to them) will agree that deciding one
way is following a rule and deciding the other way is breaking a rule, then most judges will be
more likely than Houdini to decide in accordance with that anticipated consensus.
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lowing a rule consists in finding some general description of circumstances contained in an authoritative source, and then, if the
circumstances fit the general description, doing what the source says
to do.
These acts demand that one actually can decide when specific facts
exist, when those facts are examples of a general category, and what
the general category is. Each of these steps is problematic. Even when
they seem noncontroversial, explaining why they were easy has itself
been difficult. Nonetheless, in particular communities, at specific
times, some actions are uncontroversial examples of following rules.
Many factors make it possible sometimes to agree about general categories, specific facts, and how they connect. People who reach such
agreement share contingent but stable cultural, linguistic, biological
and social characteristics. We share some beliefs, values, and
understandings.
Among these common factors is a shared understanding of rule
following. We disagree over important details, such as whether to
consider the intent of rule makers, or the meaning of the words they
use, when they seem to diverge. Still, we largely agree about broad
outlines. We assume that a rule was developed by people much like
us, who had some purpose in mind that we can and were meant to
understand, that they used words in the ways usual among the people
to whom the rule is addressed, and that they made the rule knowing
that it would need to be interpreted by people who shared these
assumptions.
Additionally, both followers and makers of rules assume that people trying to follow a rule will be engaged in a sincere attempt to determine something about its intended application. We disagree about
whether interpretation involves asking what sorts of situations the actual rule makers had in mind, or whether we should consider what
situations reasonable makers of such a rule could have had in mind for
it to govern, or whether we should consider the reasons they might
have had for enacting it. But we agree that rule following involves
making a sincere effort to answer some such question. I do not presume that this is possible. Nevertheless, consensus about when a rule
applies is facilitated by the fact that people sincerely make this attempt, and expect that others will as well.
Houdini falsifies these assumptions. He does not try to follow
rules. He sees decisionmaking as a tactical game, the point of which is
to pursue his own goals, whether or not he believes that the rule can be
most reasonably understood that way. He does not care whether most
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other people would interpret it this way. The only check on his interpretation game is whether he can get away with implementing his
goals.so
Houdini is willing to manipulate. By manipulation, I mean intentionally ignoring what one believes to be the most convincing argument and instead offering legal arguments that one believes to be less
strong, while failing to disclose one's reasons for doing so.s 1 Houdini
will pretend that he is engaged in an attempt to follow rules, and that
he is not ignoring the purpose of the statute or its most natural interpretation. In an effort to win, he will misrepresent his motives for
decision and his opinion about what legal arguments seem to him most
convincing.
When Houdini does not like a rule that seems to control a case, he
tries to write an opinion distinguishing the apparently governing rule,
or finding an exception to the rule that will seem at least minimally
acceptable to others whose respect he needs. Nothing save for time,
intellect, and other job and life pressures will keep Houdini from this
work. Houdini's role conception does not forbid manipulation to
achieve political goals .. If Houdini notices that he is manipulating, he
will not lose self-esteem.
Houdini's manipulation should not be confused with other activities, such as careful thinking or candid activism. A very careful judge
might believe that her task is to follow the law. She never decides a
case until she has considered all possible arguments, including the arguments that Houdini will often use to manipulate. Sometimes she
will be convinced by an argument that upon first inspection seemed
unappealing. She differs from Houdini, however, both because she
feels obligated to follow the law when she thinks it wrong, and because
she feels obligated candidly to offer the reasons that convince her.
An activist judge might believe that the goal of judging is to do
what is best for the world in every case, and that she must consult her
own moral vision in order to do so. Like Houdini, she does not have
the goal of trying to follow law. Unlike Houdini, however, she believes that she is obligated always to disclose exactly why she is deciding a case. If she comes upon a rule or principle that she thinks
nonideal, she says so. She offers moral reasons in her opinions for
SO. Of course, Houdini cares how other judges interpret in the sense that he must consider
how others, including reviewing judges, will react to his decisions. But he cares about conforming with other people's view of following_ law only in this instrumental sense.
51. I do not count as manipulation writing an opinion offering reasons that one finds less
than compelling in order to obtain a majority on a collegial court. I agree with David Shapiro
that not expressing all one believes in order to obtain a majority does not necessarily compromise
candor. See D. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 736, 742-43.
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ignoring rules, ot overturning them, or creating exceptions. Candid
activism is not manipulation. 52
By saying that Houdini will follow rules less often than other
judges, I mean that in cases in which almost all who view their task as
trying to apply rules would agree about what a rule requires (despite
varying moral views, and views of the wisdom of the rule or its purpose), Houdini will less often reach that result when he thinks he can
get away with it. He will still sometimes follow rules because he
agrees with them, because he cannot invent a way to manipulate the
rule, or because he thinks that the risk of manipulation is not worth
the harm of being seen as a Houdini.
Judges with other role conceptions will be more constrained. 53 If
they see themselves as more politically neutral than Houdini, other
judges will want to act in accordance with their own view of following
rules or discovering values - which might include not working too
hard to resolve splits between how the law is and how they would
prefer it to be. 54
52. Whether Houdini would be significantly less constrained than a candid activist judge
seems to me a difficult question. The candid activist need not seek precedent-based arguments,
which could make her less constrained. However, unless she is a Supreme Court justice, fear of
reversal could make her more constrained. I offer no further speculation. I point out only that
activism and manipulation are not the same. Other parts of this article offer some discussion on
the desirability of a more activist judiciary. See infra section 11.B.4.
53. The theory that judges' beliefs about their appropriate role affects their decisions has of
course been a subject of much empirical study since at least the middle 1950s. Because the
studies cannot easily isolate single factors to determine what affects judicial decision, the results
are inconclusive. However, a number of studies have found the possibility of some correlation
between judicial role conceptions and judicial behavior. See J. HOWARD, CoURTS OP APPEALS
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SY5fEM 167-88 (1981); Champagne & Nagle, The Psychology of
Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OP THE CoURTROOM 258, 269 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982);
Danelski, Causes and Consequences of Conflict and its Resolution in the Supreme Court, in JUDICIAL CoNFLICT AND CoNSENSUS 21, 26, 44 (S. Goldman & c. Lamb eds. 1986). Particularly
supportive of the position that judges who believe in a constrained role will be more constrained
to decide against their preferences are studies by Theodore Becker. See T. BECKER, PoLmCAL
BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 88-146 (1964); Becker, A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effects ofJudicial Role Variations, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 677, 680 (1966).
For additional discussion of the effect of judges' beliefs, see Gibson, Judges' Role Orientations,
Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911 (1978); Gibson, The
Role Concept in Judicial Research, 3 LAW & POLY. Q. 291 (1981). But see Flango & Schubert,
Two Surveys of Simulated Judicial Decision Making: Hawaii and the Philippines, in CoMPARA·
TIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (G. Schubert & D. Danelski eds. 1969).
54. See, e.g., Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the ''Politics" ofJudging: Dispelling
Some Myths about the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 619 (1985); Rubin, Does Law Matter?
A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307 (1987).
Although the public language of judging remains very close to formalism, see Rubin, The
Practice and Discourse ofLegal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1862-65 (1988), few judges
are formalists. Surveys of judges suggest that the vast majority believe neither that they should
implement their moral views whenever the opportunity arises, nor that they should or can always
avoid doing so, though these surveys surely miss exceptions who do view their role as exercising
power when they can.
One study, for example, inquired of federal appellate judges in the Second, Fifth, and D.C.
Circuits how they felt judges should handle the tension between judicial innovation and the obli-

November 1990]

Beyond Candor

313

Consider two other judges: Hapless, who believes in formalism;
and Hercules, who agrees with Ronald Dworkin. ss Assume that each
is confronted with a case that seems to be governed by precedent, but
whose outcome he dislikes.
Unlike Houdini, Hapless cannot work directly to avoid a rule. In
order to get to the answer he wants, Hapless must not only think of an
acceptable legal argument for the conclusion, he must do so without
noticing that he is trying to do that at all. If he did notice that he was
trying to manipulate a rule for political reasons, his own beliefs about
appropriate behavior would lead him to feel dissonance or guilt, and
(at least sometimes) to stop. Hapless believes both that he must follow
what seems to be the best legal argument, and that he should disclose
the reason for his decision in the opinion. Therefore, if he is to reach
the decision he likes without perceiving himself to violate his own
norms, he must engage in the mental contortion of manipulating a rule
without noticing that he is manipulating the rule (or even that he is
trying to hide this fact from himself). Imagine being a magician who
must trick not only the audience but herself as well. This will sometimes prove a hard task. Although people often fail to see the nature
of their own acts, when manipulation requires great effort, judges who
cannot direct all their energy toward the task may fail. Hapless might
therefore, more often than Houdini, give up and "follow the rule" despite disliking the outcome.
Hercules will also face a problem more difficult than Houdini.
Hercules can only rule against his impression of the law if he believes
that the justification he offers really is the one that is most consistent
with all the other (rightly decided) cases, and with the best theory of
the law.s6 Hercules' work might be harder than Houdini's, because it
will involve finding an explanation that both seems acceptable to the
general legal community and appears to Hercules to be produced by
the strict requirements of Dworkin's task for Hercules.
gation to just apply the law. Of the judges who could easily be categorized, about 14% believed
that they should innovate whenever they were able. Nearly 26% of the judges condemned judicial activism as inappropriate. And about S7% took views between these extremes. See J. HowARD, supra note S3, at 160-64. A somewhat similar distribution was found in a study of state
supreme courts published in 1971. See H. GLICK, SUPREME CoURTS IN STATE PoLmcs 38-S4
~~

'

SS. Dworkin's views have of course changed over the years. Little in the textual discussion
turns on which of his positions Hercules believes. Generally, Dworkin requires Hercules to decide hard cases by invoking those principles that are most consistent with a theory that explains
most settled law. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 67-68 (1977); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 238-40 (1986).
S6. If the law is immoral enough, Hercules might be able to justify lying. See R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note SS, at 326-27; R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note
SS, at 202-06.
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Some commentators have suggested that Hercules will not be constrained by Dworkin's task. They contend that the law is so filled with
conflicting rules and principles that a sincere Hercules will always be
able to convince himself that the law is most consistent with the principle that allows him to reach his desired result. 57 I do not fully agree.
Although he would sometimes convince himself that the best theory of
the law incorporates his own moral principles, 58 he will sometimes be
unable to do so. Despite the conflicting principles present in most areas of law, often one principle seems to dominate an area, at least for a
time. When this happens, a sincere Hercules might be unable to convince himself that his favorite contrary principle really best explains
the most cases. 59 If there are instances in which Houdini can construct an argument from precedent or principle, but Hercules cannot
generate arguments that he sincerely believes represent the best theory
of the law - even though he likes the outcome - then Hercules' belief in Dworkin's theory Will have constrained his decision.
Houdini will follow rules less often than Hapless or Hercules if
there are any cases in which (1) there is a rule, in the sense that most
people would agree that a general category is fulfilled under a particular authority; but (2) it is possible politically and rhetorically to get
away with a different outcome. It seems likely that some significant
number of these cases exist.
One might think that in cases not governed by specific rules, Houdini would be indistinguishable from other judges. If there is no rule
to follow, Hapless and Hercules cannot follow rules more than Houdini. Yet, when rules run out, law can still constrain. In cases of admitted rule indeterminacy, Houdini will look to see if he can offer any
value-based arguments that seem generally acceptable to the public as
reasons for his desired outcome. If he finds one, he will not be deterred from offering it either because these reasons are not the ones
that convince him, or because he thinks that among the publicly acceptable arguments these are not the best.
By contrast, although Hercules and Hapless will also invoke valuebased arguments, they will not offer value-based arguments they do
57. See A. Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & Pun.
A.FF. 205, 231-32 (1986).
58. See id. at 230.31.
59. I recognize that Dworkin's task for Hercules is to find principles that explain the most
cases in all areas of the law. However, as I assume that this task is impossible even with Hercules's infinite skill, Hercules will be apt to focus on principles embodied in areas of law most
related to the particular case. At least this is the tendency of real judges and scholars in practice.
See A. Altman, supra note 57, at 220. Dworkin's theory permits this. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 250.54.
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not sincerely hold as good legal reasons. Hercules, for example, may
sometimes conclude that the best theory of the law counsels deciding a
case against his own view of what a prudent decision would require,
even when no specific rule applies and when he could get away with a
different decision.
I have offered some theoretical reasons for thinking Houdini less
constrained by law than are other judges, both when rules seem, to
govern a case, and when they do not. Evidence supporting or contradicting my suggestions admittedly is difficult to produce. I cannot
compare judges who take Houdini's attitude with those who take Hapless' attitude to show which group more often follows law. We lack
access to most if not all judges' beliefs about their own decisions. Further, deciding which decisions counted as following law would itself be
an exercise influenced by the decisions of the researcher. 60
Several facts nonetheless suggest that role beliefs constrain. First,
anecdotal evidence supports the conclusion that some judges both do
not believe that they need to follow rules, and do vote for positions
that seem to many others to be examples of manipulation. 61 Second,
although I do not believe everything judges say in opinions, I am inclined to think that some significant number of the opinions stating
"although I personally disagree with the outcome, I feel bound ... "
are sincere disclosures of the judge's experience of deciding. 62
Still, some might object, even if judges follow the law in part be60. Nevertheless, people do try to engage in this sort of study. See, e.g., Stem, Special Issue.·
Judging the Judges: The First Two Years of the Reagan Bench, 1 BENCHMARK no. 4-5 (1984).
This study examined the decisions of all Reagan judicial appointees until 1983. By reading all
these opinions, and deciding whether each opinion "practiced judicial restraint" the author concluded that the "President has, in general, kept his pledge to appoint men and women to the
bench who exercise restraint." Id. at 2. This 118-page report did nothing other than look at
each judge's opinions and express a view as to whether the examiner considered the opinion to be
restrained.
61. See, e.g., Karpay, En Banc Furor, Liberal Fury, NEW JERSEY L.J., June 2, 1988, at 10,
col. 1 (discussing the apparent willingness of some conservative D.C. Circuit judges to decide
cases according to a political agenda); Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 61 N.C. L. REv.
29 (1988) (reporting these allegations, and offering evidence that they are accurate but overstated, and equally true of liberals and conservatives).
62. Even a casual computer search of cases containing words such as "Despite my preference" or "Although I personally" will tum up many cases in which judges express the view that
if they could decide unconstrained, they would very much like to vote the other way. See, e.g.,
Gwin v. City of Tallahassee, 132 So. 2d 273, 277 (Fla. 1961) (O'Connell, J., concurring)
("Although I am personally opposed to participation by government in private enterprise, •.• I
am forced to agree with the majority opinion because I believe it correctly follows the law of this
state."). Such comments even appear in dissents, where one would expect not to find judges like
Houdini making such claims. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595, 600 (Fla. 1981)
(Overton, J., dissenting) ("Although I personally believe the majority's decision serves the best
interests of the public and the legal profession, my reading of the cases cited by the majority leads
me to the legal conclusion that we can regulate ..• but [not] prohibit [the conduct in question].";
State v. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 513, 627 P.2d 922, 945 (1981) (Stalford, J., dissenting)
("Although I personally find the thought of death by hanging to be abhorrent, ... I cannot for
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cause they need to maintain views of themselves as constrained, actual
constraint requires that judges' beliefs about what the law requires
sometimes differ from how they want to decide. Many judges will
view the law as requiring what they prefer, both because everyone
tends to see the world as they want it to be, 63 and because judges are
drawn from groups that have reason to like the status quo. Because
Hapless will rarely feel the desire to decide differently from the way he
thinks the law demands, he will probably be able to rationalize a bit of
manipulation in those few cases in which he does want to decide differently. Therefore, the objection concludes, we should expect no difference between real-world Haplesses and those same judges were they to
adopt Houdini's attitude toward law.
Hapless is nonetheless more constrained than Houdini for two reasons. First, the political commitments of sitting judges and laws vary.
We now have some liberal statutes and precedents, and many conservative judges. Many judges experience a difference between our relatively liberal laws and how they would like to decide. 64 Of course,
nothing here turns on the judges being more conservative than the
statutes. I assume that parallel constraints function when the judge is
substantially more liberal than the laws.
Second, how a judge wants to decide is influenced by her beliefs
about following rules. Because Houdini believes manipulation is acceptable, he often looks carefully at how he would like to resolve a
case, and therefore readily uncovers disparities between the law and
his own.views. Because Houdini does not regard a result being "dictated" by the law as a reason to prefer it, he will want to manipulate
whenever he finds such a disparity.
Hapless, by contrast, does not as often consider as a separate question how he might decide the case if the law did not seem clear. He
does not see this inquiry as a central part of his job. Therefore, he will
less often discover differences. Furthermore, when the law dictates an
outcome different from the one he prefers initially, he might change
that subjective reason alone hold it unconstitutional. A law should not be declared unconstitutional just because one does not like it.").
63. D. GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS 61-66 (1985); Wilson, Self-Deception Without Repression: Limits on Access to Mental States, in SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDER·
srANDING 96 (M. Martin ed. 1985).
64. Although correlations between judicial characteristics and voting patterns have sometimes proved difficult, one correlation is beyond question: judges appointed by Republican presidents vote more often for conservative outcomes than do those appointed by Democrats on all
issues that have definable liberal and conservative positions. See, e.g., Note, All the President's
Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 87 CoLUM. L.
REv. 766, 783 (1987) (reporting that Democratic appointees are about twice as likely as Republican appointees to vote for liberal outcomes in an array of cases including discrimination, § 1983,
and government-benefit claims).
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his own opinion because he regards a decision being dictated by law as
a reason to prefer it. Hapless' preferences are more apt to be shaped
by what the law is than are Houdini's.
In addition to being individually less constrained, Houdinis decrease laws' constraint within a system in two ways. First, if a system
has many Houdinis, the level of indeterminacy could rise. Rule following is possible partly because we often agree what the relevant category is, and what the facts are. We often agree in part because we try
to follow rules and expect others to do the same. We might find that
we agree less often if some significant number of judges stopped trying
to follow rules, and especially if this fact became known and accepted.
Imagine that all judges had Houdini's belief that a judge should
play a game, the goal of which is to implement her view of what is best
for the world, and the rules of which are to write opinions according
to a vaguely codified set of acceptable legal moves. Imagine also that
all judges and legislators know that this is the view held by judges.
Legislation and judging in such a world might become warlike,
with legislators trying to use words that cannot easily be manipulated
according to the somewhat standardized rules of the game. Judges
would try to win battles with each other and with the legislature by
using tools of interpretation to secure political victories. 65 Perhaps the
rules of the game would also change as the war escalated. Were this
the process of decision, we likely would find much less agreement
about what a rule required. 66
Second, the perception of Houdinis manipulating in a system can
drive other judges to adopt Houdini's cynical attitude toward law.
Judges follow laws that they dislike in part because they value a system in which all judges will do the same. They suspend their own
6S. This would be like trying to write a chain novel in which the goal was to frustrate the
story being told by some of the other storytellers. Cf R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note
SS, at 228-32.
66. The doctrines of indeterminacy and underdeterminacy are partially self-fulfilling; the
more that we believe them, the more they will be true. Cf Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J.
S09, S19-20 (1988). Schauer offers three views of constraint. In the first model, judges can always avoid an apparently applicable rule by using an available escape route, or can add to the list
of escape routes. In model two, judges can also always find an escape, but must use existing
doctrines. In model three, judges will sometimes find themselves unable to use an escape route,
and will therefore feel compelled to apply a rule even if they do not like the outcome.
Schauer wonders whether the formalism of model three is psychologically possible. Id. at
S30. One factor that makes it psychologically possible, and that could make it stable, is the
widespread belief that it is both possible and morally required for acceptable judging. If judges
and others whose respect they need believe that the stock of escape routes is closed, and that
those available have clearly defined acceptable uses, then - although they will in fact sometimes
invent new ones, and use the existing ones broadly - they will sometimes refrain from doing so
to maintain their self-respect and the respect of others. Formal rules will then have succeeded in
constraining decision.
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moral views to some extent in order to be part of a system in which
other judges will suspend their moral views to some extent. The perception that the other judges are breaching that agreement removes
one incentive to continue putting aside their own moral views. The
perception of manipulation can thus lead to more manipulation. 67
Although I cannot name names or offer proof, it is my sense that an
increasing number of judges - liberal and conservative - are falling
prey to the temptations of Houdini's attitude, and that this is both
fueled by and fueling what some perceive as an increasingly politicized
judiciary.
C. How Introspection Threatens Partially Self-Fulfilling Beliefs

So far, I have argued that how much law constrains depends in
part on what judges believe about their decisions. Houdini is less constrained than other judges, and the presence of Houdinis can make
judges less constrained, either by reducing the determinacy of law generally, or by causing otherwise sincere judges to defect toward Houdini's attitude. To connect this argument with nonintrospection, I
next consider whether judges with accurate understandings of their
own behavior might be less constrained than those who hold false beliefs. I also suggest that they might be less candid. Introspection
might lead Hapless and Hercules to abandon their theories, becoming
Houdinis themselves, or to adopt attitudes that, although not so cynical as Houdini's, would reduce law's constraint.
Were Hapless to introspect, he would discover that he cannot always decide cases without some reliance on his own moral and political views, at least at the stage when he describes the issue to be
67. Consider the analogy between judges' roles and a prisoners' dilemma. See generally M.
TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF CooPERATION (1987); A. RAPOPORT, Two PERSON GAME THE·
ORY (1966); A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CoNFLicr
AND CooPERATION (1965). Judges could be understood to benefit by changing law to fit more

closely with their moral views, and harmed when judges with different values do the same. Each
judge might individually be made best off if she ignores the law when she disagrees with it, and if
the other judges always follow the law. But if society benefits from the predictability of rule
following, or other virtues of constraint, society might benefit if judges almost always follow the
law.
Because judges decide cases repeatedly, one can see judging as an iterated prisoners' dilemma.
As well, it has the opportunity for degrees of defection, and for defecting while trying to hide the
fact that one is defecting. In such circumstances, it is possible for cooperation to emerge as a
stable pattern. See, e.g., M. TAYLOR, supra, at 65-78. However, if one player perceives the
others to be defecting, this perception can lead to further defections.
I do not mean to suggest that the prisoners' dilemma captures the subtle and complex forces
affecting judging. Judges have many interests and many reasons for following laws that they do
not like. As well, unlike most prisoners' dilemma models, judges cannot know when other judges
defect, because disagreeing and cheating look alike. Nonetheless, one force that helps judges to
follow rules could be the belief that other judges will do so as well. If so, the perception of
Houdinis can lead to more Houdinis.
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decided. Hapless' formalism hides moral choices that he makes when
he frames issues and selects levels of abstraction for the terms in his
syllogisms.
Hercules might likewise be disappointed by introspection. Hercules believes that he should not ignore a huge portion of cases that defy
a best theory of law, and that he should not select principles that best
fit his own political and moral preferences. 68 CLS arguments strongly
support the conclusion that Hercules' task is not always possible.
Legal doctrine is sometimes so internally contradictory that no theory
is consistent with a large portion of decided cases. 69
Even if Dworkin is correct in thinking that Hercules' task is possible for a judge with superhuman intelligence, no real judge could ever
construct such a theory. 70 An introspective judge would discover that
she often violated Dworkin's requirement that her "threshold of fit"
not be "derivative from and adjustable to [her] convictions of
justice. " 71
Hercules or Hapless might renew some form of denial in order to
maintain some self-esteem. By doing so, each could retain the belief
that he was succeeding at the requirements of his role. Alternatively,
each might alter his belief about what constituted a legitimate decision
so that his beliefs conformed to an action at which he could actually
succeed. 72
Of course, introspection might not drive Hapless or Hercules
either to denial or to abandon their theories. Often, following law is
possible. Introspection would reveal to both judges_ that they sometimes succeed at their tasks. Nonetheless, I contend that if Hapless
and Hercules introspect and discover the extent to which they follow
the law, the risk increases that they will defect to Houdini's position
and therefore be less constrained and less candid.
To focus the argument, consider a group of district judges facing
statutory interpretation issues. They believe in formalism as a means
of decision when there are rules to apply, and some version of
Dworkinian best fit theory when they find gaps, conflicts, or ambiguities in the rules. In this group, a judge follows a rule when she finds
facts, locates a statutory provision that applies to the;m, and does both
things in a way that most everyone who considered the matter with a
68. See A. Altman, supra note 57, at 231.
69. See id. at 222-24. '
70. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 264-65.
71. Id. at 255.
72. This is the central insight of cognitive dissonance theory. See supra notes 33-38 and
accompanying text.
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view toward finding and following a rule would agree. Similarly, she
fills gaps when she acts in a way that most others would agree is the
most consistent with principles implicit in the law. Such consensus is
often available, even among judges with different political and moral
views.
Assume that there is consensus about the existence of a rule or a
determinative principle in 70% of the cases before the judges. Assume
further that the judges believe there is such a consensus in 90% of the
cases before them. Everyone agrees that 10% of the cases are indeterminate either by rules or by principles, and that disagreement about
what to do should be expected among judges with different moral or
political beliefs in these cases. 73 I am assuming for the example that
judges overestimate their ability to follow law. This example will suggest why introspection increases the risks of Houdinis assuming such
overestimation. I take up the validity of this assumption below.
In 20% of the cases, judges mistakenly think they are following
rules or being guided by principles. In these cases, they have erred in
thinking that there would be a consensus about the presence of a rule
or the dominance of a principle. In fact, other judges with different
moral and political views would decide these cases differently. Perhaps they have been blinded to ambiguities in the statute or in the
precedents by their own moral positions. This possibility should not
be surprising. We all tend to see as universal things about which we
feel strongly. 74
These judges are not introspective. They mistakenly fail to notice
in every fifth case that they do not follow rules or find the best fit.
They might, however, introspect in two ways: (1) identify the cases in
which they wrongly think that they have followed a rule or found the
best fit; or (2) realize that these cases exist, so that they have an accurate understanding of the fact and frequency of their mistakes. I suggest that although dispelling inaccurate self-conceptions in either way
could have salutary effects, it might decrease both constraint and
candor.
Consider an example. Two judges separately hear a criminal case
against Bob. Judge A supports abortion rights. Judge B strongly favors protecting the accused. Bob gave a party attended by his niece,
whom he knew to be 14 and pregnant. When she arrived at the party,
he motioned toward the bar and said, "Help yourself to a Martini."
73. I offer these numbers simply to illustrate a point. I would be just as happy to make the
same point with numbers indicating somewhat more indeterminacy.
74. See, e.g., Ross, Green & House, The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in
Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 279 (1977).
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Bob is charged with two counts of "knowingly serving alcohol to a
minor." The statute defines minor as "anyone under the age of eighteen." Count one is for serving his niece; count two is for serving her
unborn fetus. 1 5
Judge A convicts on the first count and acquits on the second, finding both to be easy cases. A believes the first case fa11s squarely under
the literal meaning of the statute and its obvious purpose, and that the
second is clearly outside both. She suppos~ that reasonable people do
not understand fetuses to be "under the age of eighteen" or to be
"served" when someone offers a drink to a pregnant woman.
Judge B finds both cases uncertain. She is not sure whether Bob
"served" alcohol, since he did not pour the drink or bring her the
glass. She is not sure whether someone not yet born is "under the age
of eighteen."
It seems to me that there is clear law in case one, that Judge A
followed it, and that Judge B was wrong to see it as uncertain. Case
two is less clear, Judge B correctly saw it as uncertain, and Judge A's
certainty seems misplaced.
A and B might have made their mistakes due to the pull of their
underlying political beliefs. Perhaps A did not see the ambiguity in
case two because she feels so strongly that a fetus is not a person, and
that fetal abuse and abortion rights are connected issues. Perhaps B
saw case one as uncertain because she really opposes paternalistic
legislation.
If such unconscious factors did influence A and B, perhaps A and B
could become aware that they were influenced by controversial moral
views. By recognizing a consensus against her own intuitions, B might
follow the consensus, and convict Bob on count one, thereby increasing constraint. In case two, A might expose the indeterminacy and
offer moral reasons for acquitting on count two. Recognizing the indeterminacy might improve her decision, because she would give more
thought to the best thing to do.
Of course, one might think A less constrained in the sense that she
would no longer feel compelled to follow what she formerly perceived
to be a rule. However, A is not rea11y less constrained. First, recognizing the absence of a rule would not alter A's decision in this case because A liked the outcome she thought the rule dictated. Therefore,
she was not constrained at a11. Second, even if she had disliked the
rule, the thing that she thought constrained her was not a rule, but her
75. This case is not entirely fanciful. A Florida woman was recently convicted for delivery of
cocaine after she "delivered" cocaine to her fetus through the umbilical cord. See Cocaine
Mother Gets 15 Years Probation, L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1989, § 1, at 2, col. 1.
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misperception. I will call this false constraint - deferring to what one
mistakenly believes to be a legal rule. I do not count removing false
constraint as decreasing the real constraint of law.
I expect that genuine false constraint, in which a judge wrongly
believes a case governed by a rule she dislikes, is rare. 76 A judge
would not misperceive the law to forbid her desired outcome. Motivated misperceptions would usually lead judges to misperceive the law
as supporting their desired results as it did for A.
In sum, introspection might have only good effects. It might (1)
increase the constraint of law; (2) encourage awareness of real uncertainty; (3) possibly decrease law's false constraint; and (4) increase the
accuracy of judges' stated reasons for decision.
On the other hand, the judges might react less desirably. B might
not care to convict on count one. If she did not see the consensus
because she felt strongly about the issue, she might ignore the rule
once it came to her attention. A might find that her real motives are
not disclosable in contemporary legal dialogue. If she felt strongly
about the matter, she might prefer to abandon candor, and offer legally acceptable but insincere reasons for her decision.
If A recognizes case two as indeterminate, but writes an opinion
pretending that she is following a rule, introspection would not have
improved her decision. It would have moved her toward Houdini's
attitude by making her used to abandoning candor self-consciously.
At least when misled, she was candid. Similarly, if B ignores the rule
and acquits on count one, introspection would have made her more
like Houdini because she too would be used to abandoning candor,
and because she would be used to ignoring what she believes to be the
law.
The need to reduce dissonance might lead introspective judges to
adopt Houdini's attitude. A and B believe that they must follow rules
when they exist, and find the best fit with principles in the law when
rules do not, and that they must offer publicly acceptable reasons for
decision when neither is possible. Introspection would lead them to
see that they sometimes had strong desires to violate laws, and sometimes wanted to decide for nondisclosable reasons. Their commitment
to the rule of law would make these desires uncomfortable.
They might resolve this dissonance in two ways. They might overcome their desire. They might alter their vision of acceptable behavior
76. False constraint does not correspond to the 20% error rate I hypothesize. Rather this
error rate includes cases in which judges believe there is a rule, incorrectly, but prefer the outcome they wrongly view as dictated anyway. False constraint requires wrongly believing in the
existence of a rule one does not want.
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so that indulging their desires by manipulating or offering duplicitous
opinions seems legitimate. Which solution a judge will pick seems uncertain. It will depend on the strength of the judge's desire and the
relative difficulty of adopting Houdini's attitude. My point so far is
simply that introspection creates a risk that strong desires for particular outcomes together with some weakness of will might lead introspective judges to become Houdinis.
Given this account, one might wonder why I think Houdini less
constrained by law than nonintrospective judges. According to the
example, Houdini reaches the same result as the two misled judges.
Unlike this example, Houdini will ignore law more often than misled judges. B might ignore some rules when she is strongly motivated
to so do. If, however, noticing that she is ignoring rules makes her
very uncomfortable, she will likely do so only when she can avoid noticing it, or when the rule itself makes her very uncomfortable. Because Houdini may try to ignore rules self-consciously when he
dislikes the rule only a little, he will be less constrained by law.
Consider next what might happen if (more-realistically) introspection cannot reveal which 20% of cases judges mistakenly take to be
governed by rules or principles. A judge might be blind to other positions in these cases because of the strength of her moral and political
views. Still, she might acknowledge that she will mistakenly characterize one in five of her decisions as decisions dictated by law.
This discovery too could lead the judge to adopt Houdini's attitude. Most people, confronted with failure, go on trying to succeed,
because they believe in the goal. At some level of inevitable failure,
however, people stop trying. Instead, they redefine success to protect
their self-esteem. Often they find virtue in the acts that they used to
define as failure.
Whether introspective judges would abandon following law as a
primary goal is unclear. Perhaps judges succeed enough that their
failures present no obstacle to continued efforts. Perhaps not. This is
a risk of introspection. Ifjudges cannot identify when they ignore law,
then the risk might be unwise. Although introspection creates a risk
of more Houdinis, it offers little increase in the likelihood of rule following, since judges will be unable to identify which cases are examples of failure.
The force driving these two arguments is a concern over judges
defecting from sincere effort to cynical manipulation. Evaluating this
risk is admittedly intuitive. Perhaps Houdinis are more the product of
Machiavellian temperaments developed before taking the bench than
of disillusionment or of conflict between desire and obligation. Cyni-
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cism toward law 'might be harder to produce than I have suggested.
Perhaps it would be less likely if all judges could be induced to introspect all at the same time, in an atmosphere where they could share
their discoveries. But if we urge introspection, we do so taking a risk
on these questions.
Even if it caused no defections, introspection could increase law's
indeterminacy. If judges who believe wrongly in 90% determinacy
came correctly to understand· that only 70% of cases are governed by
law, this discovery could itself further reduce law's determinacy.
Law's determinacy need not be stable. If judges came to believe
that law is less determinate than they formerly thought, they might
become increasingly willing to consider and to look for indeterminacies in the law. Although this willingness could decrease some false
constraint, it might reduce law's real constraint as well. The existence
of legal rules depends on consensus about meaning. Such consensus
could deteriorate as willingness to look for gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities increased. As the consensus decreased, the real constraint of
law would decrease as well.
To summarize, I have offered three ways that introspection could
reduce law's constraint. First, if introspection makes plain to judges in
which cases they want to rule either for nondisclosable reasons or
against a legal rule, it could lead them to adopt Houdini's attitude,
rather than suppress strong desires. If denial formerly permitted them
to believe that they followed law and yet sometimes to indulge their
strongest desires not to follow law, introspection might force them to
choose. Second, recognition of how often they fail could lead to defection just to reduce the dissonance of knowing that one fails. Both
these defection options would reduce constraint and candor. Third,
without defecting, judges who recognize law's open texture could behave in ways that make law less constraining.
My arguments have presumed that judges do not already have entirely accurate understandings of their decisions. If judges know exactly when and how often they follow rules and principles, and when
they are unable to do so because their decisions depend on controversial political views, then ignorance of these details cannot play a role in
constraint. I have only shown that if judges are overly optimistic
about the frequency with which they follow law, revealing their overstatement could diminish constrained and candid judging.
I do not presume to know either what judges believe about their
decisions or how often judges follow law. Yet, I see several reasons to
suppose that judges might overestimate the level of determinacy
achieved by looking to law. First, we have all been educated in the
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virtues of the rule oflaw. It seems likely that many judges have internalized these virtues as norms. Second, psychological studies indicate
that many people overestimate their -0wn ability to succeed at tasks
that they attempt,77 and that few decisionmakers have the ability to
assess what factors influence their decisions. 78 Third, judicial opinions
are written as if very many cases were dictated by clear rules or principles, even in appellate courts where we have reason to think that cases
are not so clear as the opinions suggest.79 If judges consider these
opinions to be candid revelations of their reasons for decision, judges
must experience their jobs as more constrained than is true. Fourth,
taking moral responsibility for deciding indeterminate cases is unpleasant, giving judges a reason not to notice how often they make
rather than follow law. Fifth, a wide array of scholars and judges has
supposed for a long time that judges lack clear insight into their decisionmaking process. 80 Though none of these reasons is dispositive,
they suggest that some judges hold somewhat inaccurate views of their
decisions.
By considering the possibility that judges are misled, I do not mean
to adopt the arrogant position that academics have some privileged
view, or that we are smarter than judges. Surely we do not and are
not. I suggest only that when a person adopts a role, which will have
some socially constructed definitions of success, she will have a different view of her own actions than will someone who need not function
in that role.
The arguments offered so far show why I think the belief in law is
partially self-fulfilling. Judges who believe law constrains are indeed
more constrained as a result of their beliefs. But they are not quite as
constrained as they think. Judges' beliefs about their decisions are
perhaps inaccurate, though they are closer to being true because
judges hold them.
In arguing that judges overestimate their ability to follow the law,
77. See, e.g., Feather, Trying and Giving Up, in SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIORS, supra note 21,
at 67.
78. See, e.g., c. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN LAW 246-51 (1983); R. HOGARTH,
JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION 56-57 (2d ed. 1987); KoneCni &
Ebbesen, The Mythology of Legal Decision Making, 7 INTL. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 5, 6-7 (1984)
(reviewing empirical research on judicial decisions and concluding that "legal decisions are actually very simple, in the sense that very few factors are typically taken into account, and that the
few factors which are taken into account are generally not those which the decisionmakers claim
they are responsive to"); Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 4, at 233 ("People often cannot report
accurately on the effects of particular stimuli on higher order inference-based responses.... The
accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access that may exist
is not sufficient ....").
79. See, e.g., R. CoVER, supra note 29, at 232-36.
80. See, e.g., works cited supra note 2; Posner, supra note 1.
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I have supposed that sometimes law clearly dictates a result, and have
relied on broad consensus to pick out these cases. Some have suggested that if individual judges can err about the law as a result of
denial or rationalization, actual legal meaning cannot be defined in
terms of consensus. After all, if. individual judges are subject to psychological mechanisms that cause them sometimes to misperceive law,
groups of judges must sometimes suffer the same fate. Therefore consensus cannot form the basis for meaning.
I disagree. I have defined legal rules as what almost all people who
view their task as trying to follow law would agree are rules, despite
their varying moral and political opinions on the issue. If (and these
are two big ifs) judges are sincere, and if they hold a wide spectrum of
views, it seems extremely unlikely that they would all arrive at the
same position through error, especially the sort of motivated error that
I have been discussing. Judges deny when they have reason to do so,
in the form of a desire to rule for nondisclosable reasons, or against
what they think the law is. But if judges hold a wide enough set of
moral and political views, those who disagree with each other on
moral issues would not tend to err about the law in the same direction.
Moral disagreement serves as a check against group illusion. In other
words, consensus is a relatively safe basis for legal meaning in a sufficiently heterogeneous community.
So far I have offered half of my justification for nonintrospective
judging: nonintrospection increases the chance that law constrains
most. In Part II, I give reasons for thinking that such constraint is
desirable. But the justification is nontransparent.
The justification is not so glaringly nontransparent as the third reason for telling Anne's parents to follow me to the tree. In that case,
telling them the reason was certain to deprive them of an ability and
absolutely debilitating for the task. Therefore, they could know nothing about the justification. The nontransparency of my justification for
nonintrospection is more attenuated. First, it is not certain that discovering how they decide cases would decrease rule following or transform judges into Houdinis. Rather, I have suggested that
introspection increases the risks of these events. Second, even if the
truth did decrease rule following, it would not destroy the possibility
of law. Instead, it might make law marginally less constraining.
Third, whether judges are in fact aware of the things that I claim they
avoid noticing is not at all clear. Nevertheless, I have offered some
account of how and why judges might maintain inaccurate beliefs
about their behavior.
Admittedly, the plausibility of this theory varies depending on
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whether one is discussing trial courts, intermediate courts of appeals,
or supreme courts; whether the decisions involve detailed statutes,
common law precedents, or broad constitutional provisions; and
whether the judge is more or less experienced, sophisticated or careful.
Perhaps for Supreme Court Justices deciding constitutional cases, the
theory has little descriptive power. I think it fairly useful in thinking
about lower courts, and especially about statutory decisions.
II. VIRTUES AND VICES OF ACCURATE BELIEFS

In this Part, I discuss virtues and vices of introspective judging. I
consider two prominent positions. The first suggests that introspective
judges would reach better decisions. The second suggests that introspective judges would advance a left political agenda. I contend that
introspective judges would probably do neither.
A.

The Traditional Version
1.

Better Decisions

Usually decisions improve if decisionmakers have more, and more
accurate, information. 81 Decisions might improve if judges accurately
understood their own decisionmaking process. If judges wrongly believe that a given case is indeterminate, discovering that a rule really
applies might lead them to defer to the rule, or more candidly to admit
and to justify overruling it or creating a new exception. Judges will be
more constrained when introspective, because when they come to recognize that they are manipulating the law for formerly unconscious
reasons, they will not continue to do so.
If judges wrongly believe that a case is determined by law, discovering how prior cases or statutes are really ambiguous might induce
them to consider moral reasons for their decisions more carefully. If
judges wrongly believe that they are not being influenced by one of
their own controversial moral views, discovering the truth might permit them to offer those views in their opinions. 82 If the view is not
81. There are exceptions. One literature suggests that when people believe they are reaching
decisions based on a wide variety of information, often they actually decide based on a very few
variables. See, e.g., KoneCni & Ebbesen, supra note 78. As well, sometimes too much information can be debilitating. Usually too much information is understood to be too difficult to absorb.
See, e.g., R. WURMAN, INFORMATION ANxlETY (1989); Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277
(1986). In some areas, even well understood information can lead to worse decisions. See Reed,
Information in Political Markets: A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dangerous Thing, 5 J.L. EcoN. &
ORG. 355 (1989).
82. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 1, at 959 (suggesting that judges would reach better decisions if they attended group psychotherapy).
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appropriate for public discourse, recognizing this fact could help the
judge to reconsider the decision. Further, if judges more accurately
revealed the forces that move them to decide, lawyers and commentators would be able more directly to address judges' real concerns. 83
Introspection could promote constraint, dialogue, and wise decisions.
I have suggested several reasons not to expect these desirable effects. Whether introspection could improve decisions depends both on
what sorts of errors judges can recognize, and on how judges would
react to such insight. First, judges might not be able to identify cases
in which they are influenced not to follow the law. If so, insight might
mean coming to know that they fail to follow it sometimes, which
would not necessarily offer benefits. Second, depending on why judges
fail to notice that they are not following law in the first place, introspection might have just the opposite effect from the one supposed by
the traditional argument. If judges fail to notice because they are
strongly motivated to reach particular decisions, then introspection
raises the risk that this motivation will dominate their commitment to
candor and rule of law, leading them to adopt Houdini's attitude. If it
did create more Houdinis, law would constrain less, candor would decrease, and decisions would not improve. Additionally, accurately
recognizing the level of constraint could decrease determinacy, even
for judges who dQ not defect.
Consequently, whether introspection would have good or bad effects seems very difficult to predict. I claim only that the virtues attributed to it by the traditional argument are not obviously more
certain to occur than their opposites, and that introspection carries
with it some risk of harm. Introspection could lead to constraint and
candor or to dupli~ity and less constraint.
2. Less Constraining Law
In evaluating introspection, one must consider not only whether
introspection will decrease constraint and candor, but also whether we
should want law to constrain less. Constraint serves important values,
but it also prevents good decisions. In this section, I argue that even if
law constrains too much, we should prefer a system without Houdinis.
In section 11.B, I consider whether we should want or could easily
create a system of candid and less constrained decision through
introspection.
83. See Minow & Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, S4-SS (1988) (arguing for introspection as facilitating dialogue). Minow and Spelman also argue that if judges do
not disclose the real animating motives for decision, they fail morally by not meeting "the critical
responsibility to give account to the human beings affected." Id. at SS.
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In general, the virtues and vices of having judges·follow what they
believe to be the law are well known. If judges follow law, rather than
doing in each case what seems to them best, many difficulties are minimized. Decisions are more predictable, offering notice to potential litigants, permitting planning, deterring litigation, and promoting
stability. If the applicable law was established by a legislature or by
many judges over time, following law limits the power of individual
judges, promoting the values of decisionmaking by consensus. Finally,
if judges hold views aberrant from or unacceptable to the community,
constraining judges limits the implementation of unacceptable values.
Constraint also has well known drawbacks. Rules are often overand under-inclusive given their main justifications. Discarding rules
often offers more just decisions. 84 As well, constrained decisions are
inherently conservative, in the sense of preventing change. Law sometimes progresses when judges change it.
In deciding whether judges should follow law that they think bad,
we engage in a tradeoff among these values. Often the decision is
thought to rest on a risk-of-error analysis. We ask whether in given
circumstances the benefits of stability, predictability, and notice are
more important than the possibility of well-tailored decisions and improved laws, and whether we worry that judges will make bad rather
than good changes. I offer no solution to this difficult question.
Whatever resolution is appropriate, Hapless and Hercules are preferable to Houdini.
Nonintrospective judges could better promote rule-of-law virtues.
They will reach decisions that evidence consensus about particular
rules and values more often than Houdini. Hapless and Hercules are
constrained by a social and interactive process. They often convince
themselves that they are following law when they believe, and anticipate that others would agree, that a rule is applicable or that a value is
present. Because they repeatedly receive praise, criticism, and other
feedback to these decisions, they can often make good predictions
about how other people will react to their claim of rule following or
value discovery. Because they need to maintain their self-esteem,
which is dependent on internalized norms that are in part socially created, they must accurately predict what others will consider acceptable acts. They will be most constrained when they anticipate violating
some consensus about what counts as following the rules or discovering values, because in these cases they will be more likely to fear retri84. F.

SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (forthcoming).

330

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:296

bution both from their own egos and from external criticism. 85
Although Houdini is also constrained not to ignore consensus about
the law, he will less often need to follow consensus positions if he can
get away with some manipulation.
A world populated by Hapless and Hercules would also offer more
stability, predictability, and notice than a world with more Houdinis.
Because Hercules and Hapless will be more reluctant to deviate from
what they believe to be a rule or a clear principle, and because they
will have this belief when they think most other people will share it,
their actions will be more predictable, and therefore offer more notice,
than Houdini's. Although any given Houdini might be very predictable if we know something about his political or moral views, trying to
predict outcomes in a world populated by Houdinis with different
views would be difficult. Further, judges' beliefs that they should follow law even if they disagree with its wisdom might at the margin lead
judges to avoid overruling, ignoring, or creating exceptions to rules,
which would in tum promote some stability. 86 Of course, these arguments are most plausible if one believes that introspection might drive
sincere judges to defect and become Houdinis. Still, introspection
would undermine some of these values if it simply reduced the determinacy of law.
Some might suggest that we have no reason to dislike Houdini. So
long as judges -0ffer a publicly acceptable reason for their decision using the language of rules, precedents, and other legal discourse, they
will be sufficiently constrained for rule-of-law purposes. We should
not require judges to be convinced by the arguments they offer. Law
develops in part because judges change it when it seems to them bad.
Some of the most important decisions can be understood as manipula85. See, e.g., Gilbert & Cooper, Social Psychological Strategies of Self-Deception, in SBLP·
DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING, supra note 63, at 75, 82-84 ("In a complex social network, people govern each other's outcomes, acting as gatekeepers who control rewards and mete
out punishments. Such mutual interdependence requires people to arrive at a shared conception
of social reality, including that aspect of social reality known as the self."); D. GOLBMAN, supra
note 63, at 159-93.
86. The possibility that judicial nonintrospection is justified by traditional rule-of-law virtues
was suggested to me by Margaret Radin's recent article, Reconsidering the Rule ofLaw, 62 B.U.
L. REv. 781 (1989). Radin's project was to salvage some of the rule-of-law virtues while rejecting a formalist conception of rules in favor of a Wittgensteinian belief that rules exist when
and to the extent that there is social agreement that a rule has been followed. I agree with her
that even if rules function very differently from the way legal philosophers have often assumed,
we can still invoke some of the virtues traditionally associated with rules to justify the way that
rules do function. But I do not think that we should offer such justifications to judges. Radin
styles her proposal as pragmatic. Probably a pragmatist should not want to import Wittgen·
stein's insights into law. Even if there is nothing more to rule-following than there being a consensus about whether a rule has been followed, believing that rule following is more than this is
part of what fosters the consensus.
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tions, in the sense that they altered the law while purporting to follow
it.
Although I agree that judges should sometimes change the law,
and conceivably that they ought on rare occasion to do so without
disclosing this fact or their reasons for doing so, we should not want
Houdinis for two reasons. First, if we must choose between misled,
candid judges and informed, duplicitous judges, we should prefer misled judges on moral grounds. Of course, one need not view Houdini as
immoral. Writing opinions is an argumentative practice. Not all argumentative practices require sincere belief. Competitive debate and
advocacy in court, for example, do not morally require that their participants believe the arguments they offer. The points of deJ>ating and
of advocacy would not be well served by such requirements. In deciding whether manipulation counts as a moral wrong for judges, we need
to consider whether the point of judging is' served by a sincerity requirement. One can imagine a system in which judging resembled debating or advocacy. The adversary system of adjudication, however,
seems designed to have deliberative, not argumentative, judging.
Much of this paper is devoted to showing why we should prefer a
system in which judging requires more sincere commitment to arguments than debating, advocacy, or being a Houdini. If I succeed in
making such a prudential showing, then manipulation should be considered immoral on the ground that it is a form of insincere argument
that in context makes the practice of legal justification less effective.
As such, insincere justifications are harmful lies.
Second, though judges should sometimes ignore law, we might not
·want them to do so in the cases that Houdini would choose. Houdini
will ignore law whenever he desires, limited only by political constraints, reversal, and the limits of his ability to manipulate existing
precedents and statutes. Hercules and Hapless will ignore law only
when all these factors are present, and they disagree with the law so
much that (a) they do not notice that they are ignoring law; or (b) they
are more troubled by the badness of the law than by breaking their
commitment to follow law. Judges who believe they should follow law
might ignore law only when they view it as very bad.
Fred Schauer has recently described our legal system as one of presumptive positivism, 87 by which he means that a judge follows rules
unless the outcome strikes the judge as very bad, in which case the
judge engages in a more detailed analysis of the best thing to do. 88 He
87. F. SCHAUER, supra note 84.
88. Id.
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contrasts presumptive positivism with rule-sensitive particularism, by
which he means always doing what seems best in the case, taking account of the values of stability, predictability, and notice that are
served by following rules even if they are otherwise imperfect. 89
A judge who sees herself as a rule-sensitive particularist will probably follow rules less often than a judge attempting to follow presumptive positivism. The presumptive positivist judge will not ask herself
about each case whether it is best to follow a rule, but only will ask
this when she is struck that something is seriously wrong. She will
therefore follow rules in some cases where, had she considered the
matter carefully, she would have found the rule less than ideal.
A judge who tries to engage in rule-sensitive particularism might
systematically undervalue the importance of rules or social values that
she does not think significant. We all have some tendency to overestimate short term concerns and to think that our own views are widely
shared. 90 Even rule-sensitive particularists who are aware of these tendencies might not have the strength of will necessary to notice that
they are overvaluing immediate results and their own values. We
might therefore get better decisions by creating a system in which
judges believe they should almost always defer to law, even if we in
fact want them to ignore law somewhat more often than we say. 91 A
system in which judges ignore and change the law the right amount
might require the sort of acoustic separation we use for juries. We tell
them always to follow the law, believing that they will nullify the law
only when it leads to truly bad results.92
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., C. FrrzMAURICE & K. PEASE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING
19-21 (1986); Ross, Green & House, supra note 74.
91. This might lead more closely to an accurate rule-sensitive particularism than if judges
tried to be rule-sensitive particularists. In fact, we might desire even more acoustic separation.
We might get the right amount of rule following ifjudges believe that they should follow all rules
that do not lead to clearly evil results. Presumptive positivism might itself be nontransparent.
Cf. G. CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 174 (1982) ("Whom would
you trust more to decide •.• torture cases generally, as we want them decided, •.. a judge who in
hard and easy cases is always declaring that we must balance the costs and benefits of torture, or
the judge who announces that our system has an absolute prohibition against torture?").
92. See M. KADISH & s. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 62-65 (1973). I neither defend
nor condemn jury nullification. I merely draw the analogy between my position on judging and
the Kadishes' position on juries: by not informing jurors of their right to nullify, we can limit
nullification to cases in which jurors have a "damn good reason" to ignore law. See United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Simpson, 460
F.2d 515, 518-20 (9th Cir. 1972). But see Dougherty, 413 F.2d at 1143 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the jury should be informed of its right of nullification); K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 366-67 (1987) (approving jury instructions of the right to nullify); Schellin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 111 (concluding that the jury must be instructed about
its power to nullify).
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If so, Houdini is insufficiently constrained. Houdini has no reason
to ignore only very bad laws. He will ignore the laws that he thinks
bad whenever he can.
B.

1.

The CLS Version

Critique as Political Tool

Some CLS scholars offer a very different image of the virtues of
introspection.93 The CLS version differs in two main ways from its
traditional counterpart. First, in comparison to liberal thinkers, CLS
writers think introspective judges will find that law determines far
fewer cases. In the extreme, they accept radical indeterminacy.
Second, CLS writers see critique, or trashing, as a means of social
change. Elites can pretend the system is just only if they believe inaccuracies about the rule oflaw.94 Guyora Binder explains: "Legal ideology . . . legitimates inequality for its beneficiaries. It helps its
beneficiaries believe their society meets the needs of the powerless....
This provides - for those powerful people who need it - a justification for vigorously repressing confrontational behavior on the part of
people without power."95
For example, some critics consider neutral decision theories, such
as rights theories, harmful to social movements. The world would improve, they say, even for those who appear to depend most on rights, if
we reached social decisions using some other language, such as discussing needs or political ideals. 96 Using the language of rights harms
social movements because initial rights victories frequently lead to
93. I say "some" both because some CLS writers do not advocate critique, and because some
do not envision critique working to create an enlightened judiciary. Instead, they hope for a
future with a less important judiciary. See, e.g., R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT 31-32 (1986) (offering a proposed government reorganization into more numerous
branches).
94. Some have suggested that trashing can be justified on the grounds that it is fun, liberating
and true. See, e.g., Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229,
1230 (1981). An even less appealing version of this justification admits that trashing may do
nothing to alter the behavior of oppressing elites. Trashing will simply make their existence as
oppressors less comfortable. Mark Kelman has written, for example:
[I] have a satisfying feeling of fighting a reasonably nonviolent war here. If nothing else, it
seems only fair that in a world of meritocratic myth in which true victims must often bear
not only their poverty and inability to control an alien environment but frequently their own
self doubts as well, spreading at least the self-doubt to the otherwise privileged is the most
minimal act of revenge.
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 327 n.85 (1984) (emphasis added).
95. Binder, supra note 1, at 29; see also id. at 35-36; Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1358 (1988) ("[I]deology convinces one group that the coercive domination of another is
legitimate.").
96. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363', 1384-94 (1984).

334

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:296

long-term losses: 97 Ifiltially rights critics argued that talking about
rights offered no benefits - only harms. 98 After a significant dialogue
on the subject,99 however, most critics seemed to agree that the relevant question is whether the real benefits of rights talk are worth the
real harms. too
Kim Crenshaw describes this dilemma in advocating civil rights
for racial minorities. The civil rights movement succeeded so far as it
did by creating an ideological crisis that challenged the logic of the
institutional system. tot By pointing to the disparity between the
American myth of equal opportunity and the obvious fact of racial
oppression, blacks forced Americans to commit to equality in order to
maintain their well-loved myth. But that commitment was entirely
ambiguous between color blindness and substantive equality. The dilemma arises because the language of "right to equality" was essential
97. Rights critics allege that rights harm us in many ways. See generally Symposium: A
Critique ofRights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363 (1984). I select this particular harm because it seems
to be the most serious and least controversial.
98. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1384. Even at early stages in this debate, however,
critics recognized that this is an empirical and contingent claim. See, e.g., id. at 1381.
99. See Crenshaw, supra note 95; Milner, The Denigration of Rights and the Persistence of
Rights Talk: A Cultural Portrait, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 631 (1989); Minority Critiques of the
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987); Minow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique ofRights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 387 (1984); Responses to the Minority Critiques of
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295 (1988); Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
589 (1986); Symposium: A Critique ofRights, supra note 97; Tushnet, Rights: An Essay In Informal Political Theory, 17 Pol. & Socy. 403 (1989); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1988).
100. Robin West exhibits this ambivalence about rights. West explains that rights talk cannot capture the harms and values of women because all theories of rights assume the "separation
thesis" - that we are individuated primarily and only later connected. West, supra note 99, at
61. Because the separation thesis is false for women, rights only succeed in protecting against
male fears of annihilation and frustration. She relies partly on Carol Gilligan for the proposition
that women experience the world as connected. Id. at 14. Many of the substantive rules that
women most need worry about now - rules about child custody, rape, sexual harassment, and
abortion - require some understanding of the harm of separation and invasion. Although these
can be restated in terms of harms to autonomy, the restatement is both untrue to the way women
experience these harms, and in any case will probably not lead to the right result. Fran Olsen
also makes this point: "Abstract rights and neutral rules are devices used by feminists to deny
what we really want while getting what we want indirectly." Olsen, supra note 99, at 429 n.99.
Yet, for strategic reasons, "reforms have often been won by characterizing women's injuries as
analogous to, if not identical with, injuries men suffer (sexual harassment as a form of 'discrimination'; rape as a crime of 'violence')." West, supra note 99, at 61.
101.
Articulating ••• demands through legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors
exposed a series of contradictions ••.• Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that
American citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if
American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the "rights" that citizenship entailed. By seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks ••• ultimately benefitted •.••
Crenshaw, supra note 95, at 1368 (citing F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS (1977)).
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to taldng the first important step. Yet that very language has come
back to haunt the civil rights movement. 102 The progress largely
stopped as soon as the inconsistency became rationalizable by notions
of formal equality: "Although it is the need to maintain legitimacy
that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to wrest concessions from the dominant order, it is the very accomplishment of legitimacy that forecloses greater possibility. In sum, the potential for
change is both created and limited by legitimation."103
Rights victories are sometimes pyrrhic. 104 Rights critics would
solve this dilemma by causing judges to abandon the rhetoric of rules
and rights. They believe that by establishing an openly political and
discretionary decisionmaking practice we can move toward a better
society. These scholars propose that judges and other elites might
abandon the defenses supported by rights discourse, and then abandon
the discourse itself, if they could be induced to introspect by critique.
Actually, the exact goal of introspection varies depending on how
much indeterminacy the writer thinks exists in law. At the extreme,
writers who endorse radical indeterminacy hope introspection will
lead judges to recognize that all decisions are dictated by moral concerns and therefore require moral justification. Those who believe in
somewhat less indeterminacy want judges to recognize moral and
political aspects in those cases that law does not control. In the following discussion, I focus on the extreme claim that all decisions are
and should be recognized as discretionary and therefore subject to
moral argument. I believe that the analysis applies to the less dramatic claims as well.
The CLS solution does not seem to me prudent, even from the
perspective of its CLS adherents. I suggest three reasons for hesitating
over the virtues of induced introspection: critique will likely fail in its
ambitions; if it fails, it increases the risk of Houdinis, which would
decrease both candor and constraint; and even for CLS advocates who
might reject the rule-of-law virtues of constraint, critique is a tactical
mistake given their political goals.
·
102. Id. at 1366 ("The fundamental problem is that, although Critics criticize law because it
functions to legitimate existing institutional arrangements, it is precisely this legitimating function that has made law receptive to certain demands in this area.").
103. Id. at 1368; see also Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 279·80 (1983)
(explaining that "[e]galitarian rhetoric has appeal because it is the American political culture's
natural language . . . . The rhetoric forces judges and other governmental decision makers to
focus on issues that are real ...•").
104. The argument that rights victories are pyrrhic assumes that further rights would in fact
benefit the people who seek them, rather than backfiring as some conservative scholars allege.
See, e.g., T. SOWELL, ClvlL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY 133-34 (1984).
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2. c;itique's Optimism: The Emperor's Clothes
Critique - or trashing - might not succeed in inducing introspection. Critique is supposed to induce introspection by revealing contradictions to the legal elites who believe them. The CLS belief seems to
be that if the incoherence of liberalism is demonstrated clearly, and in
sufficient detail, 105 eventually legal elites will see and admit the error
of their ways. If someone tells the emperor that he wears no clothes,
the emperor and everyone else will finally see and admit the truth. 106
This emperor's-clothes assumption underestimates profoundly
people's need and ability to generate new defenses, especially when
they have some strong interest in doing so. 107 Belief in neutral decisionmaking helps judges cope with unattractive facts about law.
Judges harm peopte.1os They make unpopular and difficult decisions.
Sometimes no wise decision is possible. Almost everyone wants to
avoid looking at painful facts such as contradictions in their moral
commitments, deep moral disagreement among members of their own
community, and the tremendous unfairness of the world. 109
Neutrality theories, such as the determinacy of rules and rights,
permit judges to deny their own responsibility for these facts. 110
Judges can believe in the comforting stories of democracy as majority
rule, and judicial discretion as limited by rights and rules dictated by a
fair system of constitutionally constrained democracy. If critics prove
to legal elites that the defenses they use to cope with these unpleasant
facts are just defenses, elites will not just admit the facts these defenses
permitted them to avoid. 111 Legal elites will not suddenly give up all
105. See Freeman, supra note 94, at 1235-37.
106. Some CLS writing refers to the task of critics in terms of the emperor's clothes story.
See, e.g., D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Legal Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
513, 536-38 (1989); cf. Miller, A Note on the Criticism ofSupreme Court Decisions, 10 J. Pus. L.
139, 148 (1961).
107. See, e.g., A. FREUD, supra note 24, at 49 (indicating that when one defense mechanism
fails, people move on to another).
108. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); Schaughnessy, Gilligan's
Travels, 7 LAw & INEQUALITY 1, 23-24 (1988).
109. A substantial, if somewhat controversial, literature suggests that people use a series of
defenses to maintain a belief that the world is basically just, and that most people get what they
deserve. In order to maintain this belief in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
people (1) deny or withdraw from the suffering, or (2) reinterpret the event so that they can
understand it as deserved. For a summary of empirical studies on both sides of this issue, see M.
LERNER, supra note 30.
110. See R. CoVER, supra note 29, at 229-38 (arguing that in order to reduce dissonance,
antislavery judges ruling against fugitive slaves overstated the need for rule of law, the extent to
which they were bound by prior cases, and the extent to which their decisions were dictated by
others).
111. Others have noted that critique as practiced by CLS writers has little chance to succeed,
because they must choose between demonstrating stark contradictions in oversimplified positions
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of the complicated forms of rationalization and denial that permitted
them to live with the pain of their profession from the start. 112
If neutrality theories really are defenses, judges will seek less painful alternatives such as (a) dismissing the critique; (b) if the critique
cannot be ignored, finding some new defense; or (c) modifying their
behavior so that the critique is not quite so cogent, and then return to
the defense. 113 Only if none of these techniques works will critique
induce people to abandon denial and rationalization and admit what
they wanted desperately not to see.114
Others have noted that the recent history of jurisprudence has been
an alternating series of critiques and new neutrality myths. 115 For
CLS writers who think liberalism incoherent, this cycle offers historical evidence that people confronted with the incoherence of liberalism
will spend a huge amount of time and energy shoring up their views
with complex theories rather than give up the views. Defeating all
tactics for avoiding critique is very difficult.
Our discourse is not just accidentally filled with devices that permit us to avoid looking at what modem academics view as a complicated and contradictory world. Most often, trying to get people to
abandon their devices for denial by showing them the very things that
they are trying to deny will fail. Although some academics enjoy sorting through this muck (trashing is fun), we should not forget that the
muck exists because most people do not. 116
and finding weaker tensions in more accurate portrayals of people's views. See Brosnan, supra
note 8, at 332·60.
112. Boyle argues that to suppose that CLS has such a plan is to mistake CLS for grandiose
19th century social thought:
It is ridiculous to believe that one could disrupt the massively entrenched set of power relations and collective fantasies that "constitutes" repression in our society simply by attacking
one of the more formalized and abstract fantasies and claiming that the rest are "dependent"
on it. The lines oflogical entailment are not the threads that hold together the patchwork of
social reality. To believe otherwise is to make a tactical as well as a theoretical error.
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L.
R.Ev. 685, 770 (1985). Boyle nonetheless thinks that more localized critique can be effective.
113. This third option seems to be Piven and Cloward's interpretation of the success and
then failure of the civil rights movement See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 101.
114. See generally Slusher & Anderson, Belief Perseverance and Self-Defeating Behavior, in
SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIORS, supra note 21, at 11.
115. See, e.g., Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's. 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988).
116. Responses to Unger's praise for plasticity have in some ways been similar. Unger seems
to think that context transcendence is itself a human good. Many critics have pointed out that if
this is a human good, it is certainly one that we are constituted to avoid - or at least most of us,
save for a few scholars, and then only sometimes. See, e.g., Van Zant, Commonsense Reasoning,
Social Change, and the Low, 81 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 894, 912 (1987) ("Unger's microsociological
model is descriptively inadequate in that for the most part it ignores the role of everyday routines
in social life.").
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3. Failed Critique as Houdini's Parent

I argued in Part I that introspection increases the risk of creating
Houdinis. Although CLS writers do not necessarily value rule of law
virtues, they do not aim to create a duplicitous legal system. If critique leads to more Houdinis, it will not have succeeded.
Consider three stages of judicial practice. In the first stage most
judges are like Hapless or Hercules. They are somewhat mistaken, but
they are candid and relatively constrained. In stage two, Houdinis
come to predominate. They are less constrained, and they no longer
believe the rhetoric they must use in their opinions. Stage two judges
are introspective, less constrained, and duplicitous. In stage three,
judges know that all the other judges, and others who might comment
on their work, share their·contempt for law. So they abandon discussion in the language of rights, rules, and precedent. They reason
openly about the moral and political goals that their decisions promote. Judges no longer need to be duplicitous. Neither must they
follow rules. Stage three judges are introspective, unconstrained by
law, and once again candid.111
Critique is more than description. 118 It is a political act directed at
transforming the legal system to stage three, in which judges can be
both candid and introspective. 119 Yet, critics might (despite their
goals) create and entrench stage two, in which all judges are Houdinis.
If critical argument convinces many judges that they legitimately decide based on their own political views (stage two), but does not convince and enable judges to alter legal discourse so that public
acknowledgement of the political nature of judging replaces attempts
to reason from precedent and other neutral sources (stage three), then
the project of critique will have failed doubly: judging will become
introspective, but deceitful, rather than relatively nonintrospective and
candid. Law will constrain less. The step will have been a step back
117. Recall that I am discussing versions of CLS critique that are committed to radical indeterminacy. Those who adopt a less extreme view would hope for a stage three in which judges
discuss rules and rights less often than they do at present, and offer moral reasons for their
decisions more often.
118. On this interpretation, the critique of rights was misunderstood by some of those who
responded to it. They thought that the critics meant to commend abandoning rights in favor of
something else such as needs talk or delegated discretion. The critics did not mean to commend
anything. They were simply trashing. If so, the correct way to evaluate their project has nothing
to do with whether they are speaking the truth. Rather the point is to ask whether speaking
these words was likely to have some good effect. See Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1402 ("What is
the meaning of writing this article?").
119. See Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv. 247, 267
(1984).
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both for those who value constraint and for those who value honest
dialogue.
In the end, critique might have no effect, might lead to stage two,
or might lead to stage three. I suggested above that it might have no
effect. In order to induce Hapless to become Houdini, critique must
force Hapless to take responsibility for difficult moral decisions, and to
recognize himself as a moral agent.
Despite this difficulty, critique might lead judges privately to abandon believing in law. If critique can cause judges to experience sufficient dissonance, judges might alter their ideals of rule following and
candor. Although some version of neutrality has long been a part of
the story that judges and lawyers tell themselves to justify their work,
it is not the only story available. Houdini's attitude has attractions of
its own. Houdini might believe that manipulation is inevitable, and
that, so long as it is used to morally good ends, it is justified. Perhaps
this narrative even permits judges to feel more zealous about their
jobs. Judges might also believe that other judges are manipulating, so
they are just acting as a counter, to restore something like the real
values held by society. Convincing judges like Hapless and Hercules
to view themselves as moral agents when they formerly viewed themselves as functionaries is difficult, especially when they must view
themselves as moral agents doing violence. 120 The possibility of alternate comfortable self-conceptions as a moral agent legitimately acting
makes this task simpler. Critique could drive judges to stage two.
I expect that critique cannot easily get judges to alter their discourse of opinion writing to reflect this attitude (stage three). First,
the social consequences of being the first to announce that one does
not believe in the accepted rules could be significant. Second, even if
many elites believe the same thing, so that judges do not fear retribution from their peers, it seems unlikely that the intellectual trends that
are now permitting judges to see, and perhaps admit, that they sometimes act politically, will soon become widely accepted by the public.
There is concern for censure by a broader population.
Of course, the conclusion that critique might not drive judges to
use openly political discourse is speculative. My concerns about critique are alternative. If it has no effect, it will do no good. If it fails
and induces stage two, it will reduce both candor and constraint. If it
succeeds and induces stage three, I will argue in the next section, it
will hinder the political objectives of CLS.
120. See Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the
Role, 20 GA. L. REV. 815 (1986).
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4. Successful Critique as Tactical Error

The CLS strategy assumes that if judges discussed only values in
justifying most or all decisions, the difficulties social movements face
would decrease, and we would be more likely to create the sort of
society favored by CLS writers. This strategy seems to me a tactical
mistake for three reasons: (a) the people empowered by decreased
constraint largely oppose CLS's political views; (b) abandoning law's
constraint risks harming oppressed people; and (c) stage three judges
will not likely abandon the commitments that limit social change.
a. Political opposition. If critique does foster stage three, the victory would not lead to results that appeal to its CLS practitioners.
Conservatives control the federal courts, many of the state courts, and
some legislatures.1 21 The nonconservative judges are moderates and
moderate liberals. Virtually none shares the political and moral commitments of CLS scholars. Critical legal scholars' self-professed goal
for trashing is to make judges see how much power they have, so that
they can no longer deny it. CLS scholars should be concerned that if
it works, judges might do exactly that. 122
Consider as an example Richard Posner. 123 Judge Posner believes
in deciding cases based on practical reason, which includes "anecdote,
introspection, imagination, common sense, intuition ... , empathy, im. ... , custom, memory, ,.mduct1on,
. ' ... [and] ' expenence.
.
' "124
putation
Many decisions, says Posner, "depend on the policy judgments, political preferences, and ethical values of the judges . . . rather than on
legal reasoning regarded as something different from policy, or politics, or values, or public opinion." 125 Precedents for Posner are nothing more than something to be consulted. They do not compel: "The
prior case . . . is just a source of data, anecdotal in character, or of
reasons, considerations, values, policies."1 2 6
121. See West, Progressive and Conservative Ccnstitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990)
(describing the new conservative politics of the federal judiciary).
122. Some CLS scholars acknowledge that the strategy is risky. See, e.g., Beermann, A Criti·
cal Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 8687 (1989).
123. I select Judge Posner more for his public rejection of precedent as a system of rules than
for his conservative politics. Even from a left or liberal perspective, Judge Posner's opinions are
sometimes relatively progressive. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting) (rejecting the position that fetal protection policies that apply only to women should be subject to the business necessity defense in Title
VII suits even though this defense is usually available only in cases of disparate impact), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
124. Posner, supra note 1, at 838 (emphasis added). For further refinements on Posner's
views, see R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
125. Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 845.
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Posner joins realist and CLS critics in decrying judicial self-delusion and in advocating that judges be more introspective, and candid
about not being bound:
We should hesitate to take at face value descriptions of judges as
striving always to find the correct answer rather than exercising discretion or enacting their personal values or preferences. . . . Adults delude
themselves ... ; what is more common than lack of self-knowledge? ...
. . . Neither the conditions of judging nor the methods of selecting
judges (including self-selection) would lead one to expect the deep introspection that so much academic literature attributes to judges....
. • . [L]ike other people judges want to diffuse responsibility for their
unpopular, controversial, or simply most consequential actions, and they
do this by persuading themselves that their decisions are dictated by law,
rather than the result of choice. 127

Posner considers that delusion has some virtue. Nonetheless, he seems
to dismiss the possibility that we should maintain these delusions:
Maybe the dogmatic style, pretence of humility, and ostentatious abnegation of will that characterize judicial opinions serve a social purpose.
By concealing from the judges themselves the degree to which they exercise discretion, the formalist mode may make them more restrained: virtue begins in hypocrisy (maybe).... Only one thing is clear: We should
not be so naive as to infer the nature of the judicial process from the
rhetoric of judicial opinions.12s

Judge Posner should be every CLS scholar's hero. He is an introspective judge, ready to admit that judging requires political decisions,
that judges are not bound by precedent in any interesting case, and
that they should not strive for objectivity.129 He thinks that judges
who believe in neutrality are merely deluding themselves. He is prepared to talk about values in his decisions. 130
127. Id. at 872-73. In case it is not apparent, I largely agree with Posner about the extent of
judicial delusion. I simply disagree with his assumption that this is obviously a vice to be
abandoned.
128. Id. at 865. This quote is somewhat ambiguous. Posner might be understood as endorsing judicial self-delusion if one interprets his suggestion that "we" should not believe it as referring just to academics.
129. In response to the suggestion that judges might engage in "all things considered" decisionmaking, and yet retain some semblance of neutrality by ignoring their own values and preferences, Posner says that "[a] judge who has a powerful intuition that it would be an outrage to
decide a particular case a particular way should not feel compelled to decide it that way merely
because a comparison of the reasons pro and con shows the pros with a slight preponderance."
Id. at 859.
130. Although judges' attitudes are difficult to discern, I have not detected the effects of
Posner's jurisprudence on his decisions. As a judge, he seems still to be engaged in the "ostentatious abnegation of will" that he finds in other judge's pretence of following rules. See, e.g.,
Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 741 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
("The case against the doctrine seems to us conclusive.... Despite all this we think it would be
improper for this court to reject the doctrine."). Perhaps the gap between Posner's jurisprudence
and his opinions supports my suggestion that stage three will be difficult to create.
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Critical theorists are not enthralled with their intellectual progeny.
Noting the similarities between Posner and CLS, one commentator
suggested that practical reasoning advocates such as Posner lack only
one thing: "an association with an extensive critique of the prevailing
legal and political order - that is, with the Critical Legal Studies
movement." 131 This comment exemplifies one fallacy of radical critique: critique wrongly assumes that introspection will lead not only
to recognition of power, but to political transformation. 132 Of course
Richard Posner lacks an "association with ... the Critical Legal Studies movement" 133 He would not have become a federal judge with
that association. Conservatives who abandon the belief that they are
following rules or discovering values will not automatically become
committed leftists. 134 CLS critics should see that removing constraint
means removing constraint from conservatives.13s
b. Oppressive instincts. CLS writers believe stage three will benefit
oppressed people. Several authors have expressed strong reservations
about this strategy, because constraint sometimes benefits powerless
people. As Patricia Williams explains, although it is possible that in
an informal world with fewer or no rights white people would not
discriminate against blacks any more than they do now, so long as
rights constrain behavior at all, one has reason to suspect that without
rights, some people would discriminate who currently do not. 13 6 Toni
Massaro agrees, saying that "[a] proposal implying that greater discretionary authority should be given to legal decisionmakers betrays
131. Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 81 MICH. L. RBv. 724, 730
(1988).
132. Cf. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?. 81 MlcH. L. RBv. 2099, 211S (1989).
• 133. FCinman, supra note 131, at 730.
134.
The intellectual act of making [judges' normative instincts] more visible and selfconscious will not by itself change the decisions reached. Although the unveiling of these
assumptions might spur greater reflection and motivate an occasional change of heart, most
judges will validate and ratify their informing visions; they decide as they do because of, not
in spite of, their instincts and assumptions.
Hutchinson, The Three "Rs": Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARv. L. RBv. SSS, S81-83
(1989).
.
13S. See Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence ofSkepticism, 81 MICH. L. RBv. 710, 722-23
(1988) (Judge Posner's "skepticism about the existence and identification of law, together with
advocacy that a judge act on his own social vision" serves "to do away with the traditional
'fetters that bind judges' in a fell swoop, clearing the decks for a new law based on wealth maximization.") (footnote omitted).
136. See Williams, Alchemical Notes: Restructuring Ideal From Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RBv. 401, 423-24 (1987). Not everyone agrees that rights, apart from political coalitions, can do anything at all to restrain oppressive instincts. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra
note 99, at 446 n.72. I disagree for reasons parallel to those offered for thinking law constrains
judges. In fairness, I note that Tushnet allows that rights have some uses, id. at 440 n.16, and
that their usefulness is historically contingent. Id. at 42S.
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tremendous faith in the wisdom and responsiveness of our decisionmakers. One reason to be skeptical about this faith is that 'empathic capacity' ... [islunevenly distributed among human beings."P7
Of course, constraint can also work against the interest of oppressed people. If the rules followed are discriminatory, and those
who apply the rules are less so, a system with more discretion will be
better than a system of rigid rule-following. 138 The question is contextual. In the United States today, however, the rules publicly announced likely will be fairer than the secret desires of people in power.
The world is much more filled with secret racists and sexists than with
secret egalitarians. Listening to people who experience oppression,
one hears about the dangers of discretion. 139
The issue is not whether law greatly helps oppressed people, but
whether the exercise of discretion is likely to be more oppressive than
the application oflaw. Several reasons suggest that rule-following will
be less harmful to oppressed people than discretion. Judges, like the
rest of us, exist in a world pervaded by unconscious prejudices.140
Although both our rules and our discretionary decisions will reflect
these presuppositions, rules have a much better chance of being
purged of oppressive instincts than do exercises of discretion. Publicly
enacted rules must be debated in forums generally. \lostile to expression of hate-filled sentiments. Obviously, this process does not create
perfect laws, but it can have an effect. Individuals' intuitions often
avoid this process. 141
Nor would the benefits of a discretionary system outweigh the
harms. Consider what would happen if rather than our current statutory and constitutional regime, courts were empowered to "remedy
discrimination when it seemed best all things considered." Although
some judges would order more remedies, and others fewer than now, it
seems to me that the number of curren:tly precluded 'claims that would
137. Massaro, supra note 132, at 2117 (footnote omitted); see glso id. at 2115 (arguing that
the call to context overestimates the value of empathy because it is homophobia, not distance
created by the rule of law, that leads to decisions like Hardwick).
·
138. See Schauer, supra note 66, at 543 ("It may be a liability to get in the way of wise
decision makers • . • . However, it may be an asset to restrict misguided, incompetent, wicked,
power-hungry, or simply mistaken decisionmakers w~ose own sense of the good might diverge
from that of the system they serve."); Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases (forthcoming in HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY.) (explaining that rules are useful less for predictability than as
devices for minimizing expected risks of error).
139. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 136, at ~7-08.
.
140. See generally Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protectio11: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
141. I do not mean this argument to be a priori. Currently it seems to me that publicly
acceptable discussion is much more progressive than the private opinions of most people, including most judges. Perhaps this has not always been true.
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be remedied under a discretionary regime would be dwarfed by the
number of currently prohibited acts of discrimination that would be
permitted under the discretionary regime. Civil rights laws offer a
good example. The experience there has not been primarily one of
judges, otherwise anxious to offer remedies, being constrained by the
statutory language. Rather, the statutes have been implemented more
often by judges grudgingly admitting that they could not avoid a
remedy.
Of course, constraining judges has costs. Blind adherence to rules
forecloses visionary as well as oppressive decisions. Rules lead to, as
well as prevent, mistakes. 142 In deciding whether we desire more or
less constrained decisionmaking, we must consider how risk averse we
should be toward possible abuses, and how hopeful we are about beneficial departures from law. If oppressed people prefer rules to discretion, they do not ignore the very real drawbacks to constraint. They
conclude that compelling decisionmakers to give publicly acceptable
reasons that take. the form of following the law will more often constrain oppressive rather than progressive instincts.
c. Entrenched commitment. Critique seems to me a tactical error
for a third reason: the dilemma faced by social movements would not
change in stage three. Judges would discuss values rather than laws.
But the formal equality/substantive equality equivocation, as well as
ambiguities in the ideal of autonomy, would still persist at the level of
values.
Perhaps critics think that values such as formal equality would be
displaced once values were explicitly discussed by judges. I think this
unlikely. Many ethicists maintain commitment to formal equality.
Further, even if no good intellectual reasons justified formal equality,
strong psychological reasons would make rejection of formal equality
unlikely. Believing in formal equality makes people feel better about
the world and enables them to rationalize aspects of life that make
them uncomfortable. The equality myth rationalizes the judge's access to relative wealth and luxury even in the face of the poverty that
judges encounter. Avoiding the unpleasantness of this unfairness is
important to almost anyone in a position of advantage. 143 People have
few obvious mechanisms for coping with these facts other than the
equality myth. Unlike when they abandon belief in neutral rule application, judges cannot fall back on their own moral views to justify
inequality. Perhaps critique can induce judges to see that they are
142. See Scalia, The Rule ofLaw asa Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (1989);
Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law (forthcoming in HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY.).
143. See M. LERNER, supra note 30.
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moral agents who harm people; it will not induce them to view themselves as moral agents acting within an unjust system and therefore
harming people without justification. Judges could not continue without some way to believe that they act justly. Finally, some people
have suggested that belief in formal equality facilitates racism. 144 If
so, this belief might not be abandoned until people reject the racist
beliefs that make formal equality attractive.
Whether values such as formal equality are accepted by legal elites
because they are normatively appealing, because they are rationalizations that help elites deny unfairness, or because those elites are really
racists, trashing the rule of law will not likely undermine such commitments. The difficulties of social change would remain in stage
three because the discourse of rights (like other neutrality theories)
does not prevent social change. It is so manipulable that anything
could be formulated as a right. Of course, this very manipulability
means that victories are not what they seem. When you ask for equal-·
ity, perhaps you want a commitment to ending unequal outcomes, and
all you get is a commitment to formal equality. Still, you could have
asked for a right to substantive equality and have been engaged in
rights discourse.
Disempowered people have often been unable to ask for what they
want directly not because of rights discourse, but because they knew
the answer would be "no." The answer would be "no" because political pressure or the judge's own values, interests, psychological defenses, or prejudices did not permit the desired relief. Depriving
judges of neutrality theories will not alter their values, interests,
prejudices, or psychological needs. No simple way of asking or demanding will win oppressed people relief. Instead, it must become impossible for those in power to continue to believe that society is
legitimate without giving in to the demand. The goal must be to make
Americans look at discrimination and oppression without being able
to tell themselves that this is acceptable. Dismantling belief in law is
not well aimed at this goal.
We should be working in the opposite direction-to find a way to
create a community in which law will confine more than it does now.
144. Kim Crenshaw has argued:
The rationalizations once used to legitimate Black subordination based on a belief in racial
inferiority have now been reemployed to legitimate the domination of Blacks though reference to an assumed cultural inferiority.
• . • Racism, combined with equal opportunity mythology, provides a rationalization for
racial oppression, making it difficult for whites to see the Black situation as illegitimate or

unnecessary.
Crenshaw, supra note 95, at 1379-80.
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As Martha Minow has said: "The use of rights discourse affirms community, but it affirms a particular kind of community: a community
dedicated to invigorating words with power to restrain, so that even
the powerless can appeal to those words." 145
Perhaps, however, I have misunderstood the role of critique. CLS
scholars might understand that stage three would not turn conservatives into leftists, nor eradicate racism or sexism, nor convince people
to abandon belief in formal equality as a value. Nonetheless they
might believe that stage three is a necessary prelude to their social
program. Perhaps judges use the belief in their neutrality as a means
of avoiding examining the wisdom of their values, or the possibility
that they are illicitly influenced by unacceptable ideas. If so, removing
rule following as an explanation of their decisions could be a useful
prelude to inducing them to consider these things more carefully.
On the other hand, judges who believe that they should generally
follow the law might be more receptive to arguments that the law is
racist or otherwise unacceptable. The challenge would be less directly
aimed at the judge, and therefore would be less threatening. Because
judges frequently modify rules, find exceptions, and overrule cases,
certain ideals might be challenged without convincing the judges they
were in fact altering the law, or that they can always do so.
Even if stage three would make somewhat more likely the possibility that judges consider whether they have been racist or have adopted
bad values, trying to induce stage three as a prelude to social change
seems imprudent. It risks failing and inducing stage two, which would
undermine rule of law virtues without any benefit to those concerned
about discrimination. And even in stage three, people would remain
very attached to their commitments.
The analysis in Part II has canvassed various potential virtues and
vices of introspection. I recognize that the harms and benefits that I
identify are themselves somewhat controversial. Not everyone cares
about constraint, decision by consensus, movement toward an egalitarian society, or the particular sort of society envisioned by CLS writers. Many people who like some of these benefits will dislike or care
little about others. I have sought to justify nonintrospective judging
with separate arguments aimed at readers with different commitments.
I have offered some reasons to convince someone who values traditional virtues (constraint and consensus) that a system with these virtues is made more stable by nonintrospection. I have offered other
145. Minow, supra note 99, at 1881. Although I agree with Minow about constraint, she
does not share my views on introspection. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 83, at 54-55.
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reasons to those who aim at social transformation to accept this same
conclusion.
The arguments I advance in this article, and therefore the conchisions I suggest, are hardly conclusive. At many points I have assumed
facts and relied on intuitions. For example, I assumed that judges
have somewhat inaccurate beliefs about their decisionmaking process,
and that accurate understandings present some real risk that judges
would turn cynical. Though I have offered reasons for these assumptions, I cannot prove them. Similarly, I have speculated about the
benefits and drawbacks to reduced constraint. Yet in the end we cannot know for certain what unchosen alternatives would produ«?e. Finally, my analysis has been wholly consequentialist. Even if I have
been right, nonconsequentialist moral concerns remain. For example,
we might violate norms against using others only as means if we mislead judges, or if we do not encourage them to understand, merely to
achieve social ends. Further, judging might itself be a moral activity
requiring self knowledge. Perhaps we diminish the morality of our
community by having any institution requiring deception, no matter
what its benefits.
Acknowledging all these difficulties, I assert that we act at best
with uncertainty when we demand introspection. Although judges
might already understand their decisions, and although introspection
might not plunge them into cynicism, we act taking these risks. As to
the moral concerns, I have no answer, save that consequences matter
to me, and that failing to encourage introspection strikes me as acceptable even though intentionally misleading others is not.
I conclude now with some thoughts on how problematic legal
scholarship and teaching become in a nontransparently justified legal
system if judges hold inaccurate but somewhat self-fulfilling beliefs.
Ill.

POSTSCRIPT: THE ACADEMICS' DILEMMA

The questions I have considered pose problems for the legal
scholar and teacher. 146 We face a dilemma. As scholars we seek
truth, but as teachers, we must realize that we help socialize the individuals whose behavior we study. Because we teach students about a
system they will enter, what we teach them might change the sys146. The questions have been discussed at length. See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law and the
River, 34 J. LEG. EDUC. 222 (1984); "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic
Freedom. 35 J. LEG. EDUC. 1 (1985) (collecting responses to Carrington's article); Levinson,
Professing the Law: Commitment of Faith or Detached Analysis?, 31 ST. Lams U. L.J. 3 (1986)
(and collected comments).
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tem. 147 What should we do if speaking the truth threatens to make the
system that we describe less just?I4S
My arguments, if believed, intensify the discomfort of this question. If oversimplified beliefs about the legal system help to make the
system function better, what should we tell our students? 149 If we follow our professional norms, and our usual moral intuitions, we will
simply tell the truth. But then we risk affecting the world in ways we
should regard as harmful. If we consciously dissemble, adopting Houdini's attitude toward teaching and scholarship, we may find our jobs
unfulfilling, or even morally impermissible. 150 Silence is no answer.
In the course of this article, I have argued that a particular solution to this professional tension - demanding transparent justification
and introspective practice - is imprudent. In this last Part, I want to
express some regret at the problems with transparent justification of
the legal system. I note the difficulty of our present circumstance, and
my sympathy with the sentiments that led people to demand introspection and transparency.
The predicament of the legal scholar and the predicament of the
judge are not really dissimilar. Each is in a position to have some
influence, though the judge's is more direct and profound. The professional norms for both require that their written products display some
frankness about their own thoughts. The judge must disclose the arguments that convince her that a particular legal outcome is correct.
The scholar must disclose the facts, arguments, or values that per147. Of course, students do not hear, much less believe, everything we say in the classroom.
Very few lawyers and judges read what we write in law reviews, especially lately. But some of
them hear some of it, and many of them probably misunderstand much of it. As teachers, we
must take responsibility for the consequences of what they understand us to say.
148. Because what we say could have an effect, we cannot ignore the dilemma. See R. KEEsupra note 39, at 11 (''What lawyers, law teachers, and judges say to each other and to
students about the quality of judging may tend to be self-fulfilling prophecy."). Owen Fiss has
not come to terms with this difficulty. He says, "Law professors are not paid to train lawyers,
but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to discover." "OfLaw and the
River," and ofNihilism and Academic Freedom, supra note 146, at 26 (letter from Owen M. Fiss
to Paul D. Carrington).
149. SeeNonet, The Rule ofLaw: lsthattheRulethat Was?, in THE RULE OP LAW: IDEAL
OR IDEOLOGY, supra note 40, at 125 (discussing the conflict between the desire of the teacher to
TON,

expose the "truth" about the law and the teacher's moral responsibility to educate students about
legal ideals).
150. Although I have not seen anyone say so in print, I have heard people wonder whether
some scholars have not already adopted Houdini's view toward their scholarship. I have no
insight into this question, and therefore offer no speculation. However, one candidate for a politically motivated scholarly stance is retraction of indeterminacy. Of course, perfectly good intellectual reasons support retracting one's previously stated belief in indeterminacy, such as that it
is false. But some people speculate that it has become clear to some critical scholars that - as I
have argued in this paper - the indeterminacy thesis is both partially self-fulfilling, and politically harmful to the left.
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suade her the world is as she describes it, or should be as she
recommends.
For both, the predicament arises from demanding introspective
practices: scholars notice that judges - even if they report their decision process frankly (which they do not always do)-fail to recognize
all the ways they mislead themselves. So the scholars demand introspection. If the judges believe the scholars, and become more introspective about their jobs, they face a dilemma. They can find some
different language to speak so that they preserve the candor of some
decisions, or they can retain the language of those decisions, knowing
that they act duplicitously. The dilemma is especially hard because
language does not always exist that permits judges to decide in a way
that they and the community can agree is legitimate.
Scholars face a similar dilemma. At first they notice that judges
are not doing what judges say they are doing. Scholars express this in
their articles and in their classes. While scholars write and speak, they
tell themselves that they are simultaneously and unproblematically
both scholars - speaking the truth as they see it - and activists demystifying the law as a prelude to social change or, in the traditional
version, as a prelude to open discussion. Perhaps, like judges, scholars
need to believe this story to justify their activities.
CLS scholars must either give up speaking the truth and become
self-conscious manipulators, or become ineffective, and perhaps
counterproductive, advocates. As things stand, the only frank kind of
scholarship that critical scholars can engage in is trashing and the occasional utopian vision. I have tried to argue that trashing, at least
indiscriminate trashing, is bad politics. More political benefits are
gained by forming alliances, which usually includes speaking the language of those in power. Yet most CLS scholars cannot speak the
language of formalism and neutrality in good faith. So the only alternative seems to be attempting to convince those in power to speak a
language that CLS scholars can use. Seeking this alternative perhaps
motivates the otherwise inexplicable insistence that we should just talk
about needs. 151 It is not that critical scholars are convinced they could
win conservatives over with needs talk. Rather, critical scholars believe they could get back into the game of advocacy if this language
were in vogue. Demands for transparency can be seen as scholars'
attempt to help themselves out of this situation.
This solution might also help judges out of their dilemma. If only
151. Tusbnet, supra note 96, at 1394. But see Crenshaw, supra note 95, at 1365 n.134 (pointing out that needs rhetoric is subject to many of the same criticisms as is rights rhetoric).
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judges would abandon the language of rules and precedent (or use it
less often) and simply talk as if they lived under a system of discretionary decisions, they could once again candidly and even introspectively
disclose their reasons for decision.
This vision is appealing. Recall the three stages that both scholars
and judges might find themselves in. In stage one, they believe that
law can sometimes be a practice of rule following. Judges will often be
able to report their experience of decision as an acceptable opinion
without much conscious modification. Likewise, scholars are able to
say - in terms that judges will find to be acceptable legal arguments
- what really seems to bother them about judicial decisions. In stage
one, although they are perhaps naive, both scholars and judges have
the comfort of being able to disclose their thoughts candidly as an
acceptable public dic;course.
.In stage two, some or all scholars and judges come to believe that
rules are extremely manipulable, and that the opinions that purport to
follow rules, and report the experience of feeling bound, are rhetoric.
Judges who come to hold this view must choose between writing unacceptable but candid decisions, and writing the sort of manipulative unfrank. opinion that they think other judges write. As I argued above, I
suspect that judges would pick the second. 152
Scholars who believe that judges are acting duplicitously also face
a difficult choice in stage two. They can write traditional articles criticizing courts for making doctrinal mistakes, either in the hope of influencing those judges who still believe in doctrine, or in the hope of
making the job of doctrinal manipulation more difficult for political
opponents on the bench. This places the scholar in the position of
making arguments that she sees as just rhetoric. Alternatively, the
scholar can announce that judges are in stage two. This act may drive
judges from stage one into stage two. Also, it is not certain this act
will ·have any desired political effect, even though it permits the
scholar to say what she really thinks. In particular, I doubt it will
drive judges to stage three.
In stage three, judges and scholars finally understand how problematic rule following has become and see that almost no one is any
longer able to engage in frank opinion writing (or scholarship). They
therefore manage somehow to alter professional discourse so that
many or all legal decisions are openly discretionary, and justification
involves discussing values. Stage three offers comfort. As in stage
152. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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one, judges and scholars can once again speak their minds candidly in
an acceptable public discourse. .
Although each of these stages has virtues and vices, perhaps we
should prefer an uncomfortable existence between stages one and two
to aiming for stage three. If we try to get there, I think we will fail in
harmful ways.
Overcoming self-deception is often healthy, occasionally noble,
and sometimes morally required. Judges in some circumstances ought
to become more introspective. 153 Introspection can have liberating
consequences. Certainly we admire some great literature for its ability
to unmask our daily self-deceptions and denials. We also rightly admire introspective and candid people. We rightly value truth and candor. Nevertheless, introspection can be debilitating, 154 and trying to
compel introspection can have unwanted side effects. Some useful beliefs are partly self-fulfilling, but cannot withstand introspection. 155 In
professing the law, we must consider how sure we are that we want
introspective judging, and how we expect· critique to be an instrument
for effecting this goal.
Our legal system cannot be justified transparently. Judges are
neither fully introspective nor self-conscious deceivers. By demanding
that judges be wholly introspective, we risk cynicism and deception
displacing somewhat inaccurate candor. We must be careful not to
make our ideals less attainable by pomting out the ways in which we
have not reached them.156

153. For example, the substantial literature urging judges to take account of other perspectives seems correct See, e.g., Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987);
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations. 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 323 (1987); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered. 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987); Minow
& Spelman, supra note 83, at 50-53. But see Massaro, supra note 132, at 2113 (warning that the
call for increased empathy is really a call for a substantive reordering of empathic responses).
Judges might reach better decisions if they made an effort to view si~?ons in other ways.
154. See s. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS (1989); D. GoLEMAN, supra note 63.
155. But cf. P. RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 351 (E. Buchanan trans. 1967) (discussing second naivete).
156. Many readers have gently pointed out the awkwardness of publishing this article where
judges might read il Haven't I, they ask, just told Anne's parents that the girl under the tree is
not their daughter? One reader suggested that my article might itself provide a complex rationalization to judges who want to believe they follow law. I offer them a justification not to think
about il
I justify my publication on less ambitious grounds. Judges are exceptionally busy. Few have
the time to read long jurisprudence articles. Further, even ifl am sufficiently fortunate that some
judges read this article, I do not worry about transforming their thinking. If my thoughts are
true, converting judges requires sustained public attacks, such as those made by legal realists and
by critical legal scholars. Given the strong psychological reasons, not to mention intellectual
reasons, for judges not to agree with my position, to fear that my small contribution to this
debate could alter legal culture would be hubris out of the ordinary even for a law professor.

